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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this article is to analyse the strategies employed by the Rothschilds 
until 1940 to limit competition in the non ferrous international market. We will 
study how they opted for rigid demand products of highly concentrated supply 
which were favourable to market control (mercury, nickel, lead and copper and 
sulphur) by assuming administrative monopolies (mercury from Spanish Almadén 
Mines) or through control of the leading businesses of the respective markets (Le 
Nickel, Peñarroya and Rio Tinto). We will also analyse how the family was able 
to gain worldwide monopolies, or if not, how they promoted collusive oligopolies 
with the competition in any number of forms in their quest to maintain 
profitability and to flee from any competition. 
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Introduction 
The establishment of long lasting supply monopolies is the dream of any 
businessman, albeit an almost always unreachable one. Its achievement, when 
legislation allows for such, is restricted to businesses that enjoy undisputed power 
on the market, be it due to costs, size, patents, administrative concessions or 
natural monopoly. In the world of raw industrial materials, and in particular 
mining products, it is rare indeed for a single supplier to be in a position to 
maintain any long term monopolistic structure for the simple reason that there are 
very few minerals that are to be found in just one deposit in the world. In fact, 
experience has taught us that in the case of deposits which might offer a 
monopoly, high prices and the extraordinary profits of the companies involved 
commonly lead to more mines being opened and to the appearance of competition, 
unless there is a substantial difference in extraction costs between one and another. 
In short, the monopoly is finally diluted away and the businesses are left with 
little option but to negotiate oligopolies if they are to continue to control the 
market. As regards the demand for such raw materials, these are often highly 
inflexible, and in the absence of substitutes they will grant the supply a lot of 
market power, although it is equally true that technological advances in industrial 
uses do on occasions constrain this domination. 
 
In the 1940s there was wealth of literature on monopolies and cartels 
following Rooselvelt’s antimonopoly policies and the persecution of 
institutionalized cartels in Germany from the beginnings of its industrialization. 
The studies of Hexner
1 are classical, as are those compiled by the United Nations
2 
and the British Board Of Trade
3, which focus mainly on the interim war period. 
However, Chandler
4 had already insisted on the importance of these strategies in 
the United States in response to the fall in prices at the end of C19. Apart from 
this noteworthy exception, outside the sphere of economic theory
5 cartelization 
received little attention for decades. The same could not be said of mergers and 
acquisitions, which unleashed a wealth of research. In recent years though, there 
                                                 
1 Hexner, E., International Cartels (London, 1946) 
2 United Nations, Department of Economic Affairs, International Cartels. A League of Nations 
Memorandum (New York, 1947). 
3 Great Britain Board of Trade, Survey of International Cartels and internal cartels. 1944-1946 
(London, 1976). 
4 Chandler, A., The Visible Hand. The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
Mass, 1977), chapter 10. 
5 Casson, M. insists in this in «Multinational monopolies and international cartels », in Buckley 
and Casson, The Economic Theory of the Multinational Enterprise  (London, 1984). 
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has been a proliferation of studies of cartels in business history
6. Yet there is a 
lack of illustrative examples of the behaviour of the markets in such an extremely 
strategic sector like non ferrous metals, even though it has been recognized as the 
sphere in which there was the highest level of international concentration during 
the first half of the twentieth century
7. Indeed, in the conference on International
Cartels in Business History, professors Kudo and Hara discarded the mineral raw 
materials cases on the grounds that they were less suitable in explaining 
cartelization than the manufacturing sectors
8. Schmitz would take the same stance 
in his works on copper, insisting that both the technological elements and the 
vertical integration processes were fundamental to the understanding of the 
development of the great mining businesses
9. Our research, in contrast, rebuffs 
both approaches insofar as we understand that the market agreements do indeed 
seem to have been a crucial element in the profitability of the large non ferrous 
metal businesses as opposed to their vertical integration, mergers or technological 
advances, which only become a viable alternative if other initiatives have failed. 
 
This article aims to offer a wide range of examples of monopolistic 
practices and colusive agreements exercised by a single developer for a good part 
of the contemporary history of the non ferrous metals sectors. In particular, we 
characterize and analyse the strategies followed by the Rothschilds to control, 
directly or indirectly, the international markets of four different products: mercury, 
lead, nickel and pyrites and copper together with the different responses offered to 
meet the variations occurring in the markets over more than a century. The 
novelty of our study lies in the idea that the search for agreements or the 
establishment of pure monopolies was a premeditated condition for the 
Rothschilds to be present in these markets. In other words, the intervention of 
prices through different means was the norm; competition, the exception. So the 
Rothschilds would have developed a very clear search strategy for extraordinary 
long term profits determined by the choice itself of the sectors they were involved 
in, i.e.  products with a rigid demand, a highly concentrated supply and which 
offered a large control of the market. 
 
                                                 
6 Nussbaum, H. "International Cartels and Multinational Enterprises." In A. Teichova, M. Levy-
Leboyer, and H. Nussbaum (eds.), Multinational Enterprise in  Historical Perspective, 
(Cambridge, 1986) 131-144; Akira Kudo and T. Hara, eds., International Cartels in Business 
History. (Tokyo, 1992), Dominique Barjot, ed., International Cartels Revisited (1880–1980) 
(Caen, 1994) or the recent studies by Jeffrey Fear “Cartels” in Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan 
Zeitlin, (Eds), The Oxford Handbook of Business History. (Oxfort, 2007) and Margaret C. 
Levenstein and Valerie Y. Suslow “Whst determines cartel success?”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, March 2006, PP. 43-95. To mention but a few. 
7 An exception would be the study of the chrome cartel by Phimister, “The chrome trust: the 
creation of an international cartel, 1908-38.” Business History, Vol. 38 (1996), 77-89. 
8  Akira Kudo and T. Hara, eds., International Cartels in Business History. (Tokyo, 1992), 
Introduction. 
9 Schmitz, C, “The rise of Big Business in the World copper Industry 1870-1930”, The Economic 
History Review, 2
nd series. Vol.XXXIX, nº3, 2006., 392. 
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Why the Rothschilds should have involved themselves precisely in these 
sectors is a question which has to be answered from the historical record of the 
company itself. Its origins were in the early decades of the nineteenth century and 
were linked to public loans and the issue of international loans. The Rothschild 
banking network then became interested solely in international buying and selling 
of gold and the mercury business, as we explain below. The family had proven 
experience dating from the Napoleonic Wars in exporting and arbitrage of 
precious metals, and they did not hesitate to expand on this following the 
discovery of the gold deposits of California in a 1848. As of that year the House 
of Rothschild in London, N.M. Rothschild & Sons, took steps to gain the majority 
of the new gold consignments, thus consolidating their position in the City and in 
their relations with the Bank of England. In 1852 they would win the contract for 
the Royal Mint. As a consequence, their import operations and their sales to 
central banks would boom
10, in coordination with their network of foundries and 
the mints of their French cousins
11. 
 
With the consolidation of this business, which the Rothschilds held 
uninterruptedly until 2004
12, the family carried out occasional exchanges on the 
international copper and lead markets, which they then left aside with their huge 
entry into the railway market. At the end of the 1870s, though, the third 
generation of the family would incline towards a change of course in their 
business strategy, recuperating their interest in the aforesaid markets and acting, 
this time through mining, in their clear vocation to control the respective 
markets
13. Strategic decisions were taken then which led to the Rothschilds setting 
up Société Minière et  Métallurgique Peñarroya, in 1881, la Compagnie de Boleo, 
in 1885 and their taking control of Le Nickel, in 1883 and the Rio Tinto Company, 
in 1888, all businesses that were unquestionable world leaders in the production 
of lead, copper and nickel in the subsequent decades.  
   
The portfolio of the French branch of the Rothschilds in 1906, summarized 
in Appendix 1, bears witness to this philosophy. Note that along with these shares, 
which in turn are combined with the other traditional ones held by the family, like 
railways, gold and public debt, there are others in sectors whose characteristics are 
the same as those we have underlined: temporal or permanent barely competitive 
markets characterized by the small number of suppliers or a highly inflexible 
demand in which they could exercise a strong influence on the prices, as was the 
case of the De Beers business and its jewels, the oil companies Shell, Royal 
Dutsch and Bnito, or that of  strictly monopolistic business, such as the Suez 
                                                 
10 Sales of the Bank of England reached 15.3 million de pounds that year. Ferguson The World’s 
Banker. The History of the House of Rothschild. (London, 1998), 578-579. 
11 Flandreau, M.. L’or du Monde. La France et la stabilité du système monétaire international. 
1848-1873. (París, 1995). 105 and 212-216). 
12 From 1919 until May of that year the official price of the London bullion market was fixed in 
the main offices of N.M. Rothschild & Sons. 
13 This initiative was followed by a large number of old firms of bank traders as is studied by 
Jones. Jones, G., Merchants to Multinationals: British Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries (Oxford, 2000). 
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Canal To these we must add the mining businesses, the shares held by N.M. 
Rothschild & Sons, which controlled 100% of the mercury business, and another  
24,419 shares in Rio Tinto in 1906
14. It was a portfolio that was to grow in the 
following year even faster than that of the French branch. 
 
    It is important to underline that none of these investments was made 
blindly. For mining issues the House of Rothschild Frères contracted the services 
of Jules Aron in the 1870s. He was a very capable mining engineer whose mission 
would be to advise his new bosses on the most advantageous investments to make, 
while coordinating and supervising the industrial and commercial policies of the 
businesses they controlled. Aron was made managing engineer at Peñarroya and 
Le Nickel, a post he occupied until 1917. He would be substituted by Theodore 
Weill, who held the post during the 1920s and 30s. In London, the functions were 
performed by Hamilton Smith, director of Exploration Co., a filial of the house of 
Rothschild in London, which had been set up to sponsor mining enterprises and 
which had initiated a rare growth programme, starting with a small capital of 
10,000 pounds in 1886, which had amassed 300,000 pounds by October 1889 and 
1.2 million by the end of the same year. Exploration Co. was held at that time to 
be the largest company in the world in its class
15. 
  
In short, we will layout the instruments which allowed the Rothschilds to 
take control of the markets in each of the abovementioned markets, either through 
assuming administrative monopolies or the control of the leading businesses of 
the respective markets.. From there, we will analyse the strategies used directly by 
the Rothschilds and their companies to obtain the highest possible profits from 
their positions of power in the markets, obtained either by themselves or in 
conjunction with other businesses.  
 
 
Seeking out monopolies 
Mercury. 
Mercury was the first of the markets in question to be controlled by the 
Rothschilds. Mercury has traditionally been marked by its scarcity and its 
                                                 
14 Rothschild Records London (hereinafter ARL), Stock Ledgers, 1/12/0-22.  
15 Mckay "The house of Rothschild (París) as a multinational Enterprise in historical perspective, 
1875-1914" In A. Teichova, M. Levy-Leboyer, and H. Nussbaum (eds.), Multinational Enterprise 
in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge, 1986); Ferguson, N. The World’s Banker. The History of 
the House of Rothschild (London, 1998) 876; and Turrel and Van Helten, “The investment Group: 
the mining link in British overseas expansion before 1914”, Economic History Review, 1987, 2nd 
series, XL, 2, 267-274. Revista Minera,  1-4-1889, p. 104. and Bencibengo, Yann: “Les réseaux 
d’influence de la banque Rothschild: l’exemple de la société Le Nickel en  Nouvelle-Calédonie 
(1880-1914)  », in Hubert Bonin, Catherine Hodeir & Jean-François Klein (dir.), L’esprit 
économique impérial (1830-1970). Groupes de pression & réseaux du patronat colonial en 
France & dans l’empire, (Paris, 2007). 
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surprising properties, which make it widely applicable in industry. That the 
Rothschilds gained the highest levels of world intervention is indisputable.  
 
Since ancient times mercury had been associated with paint (vermilion), 
cosmetics and medicine, but it really came to the fore in the mid sixteenth century 
when it began to be used in the extraction of silver by amalgamation from the 
huge deposits in Peru and Mexico. Up to the end of the nineteenth century 
mercury was employed intensively in the Mexican sliver mines and its demand 
was to grow still more when it was discovered that it could also be used in 
industry for gold-plating, the manufacturing of physical instruments, paints and 
mirrors, turbine manufacture which used its vapours, or as fulminating powder, 
and so it gradually ceased to be used as an amalgam. 
 
  The second feature of the mercury market lay in its scarce supply: the 
cinnabar from which it is extracted is rarely found in nature and is concentrated in 
very few exploitations around the planet, exploitations which provided the 
producers with a solid argument for imposing worldwide prices. 
 
The largest and oldest deposits are in Almadén, and so it was not difficult 
for the Spanish crown, the exclusive owner of the deposits from 1523, to take 
advantage of its monopoly and to fix an exclusive income on the product. The 
only opposition to Almadén on the world market for the next three centuries came 
from the mines of Idria, located in present day Slovenia. However, the 
sovereignty of the Austrian monarchs over the deposits made it easy to reach an 
agreement for the exclusive sale of surpluses to the Spanish crown
16. So it was 
that barring a few isolated years of the eighteenth century, the mercury form Idria 
did not compete with Spain. 
 
  Graph 1: Evolution of mercury prices and world production, 1820-1940 
                                                 
16 Sánchez Molero, L., Memoria sobre mercurios (Madrid, 1856), 21. 




































































































Prices (dollars/tonne) World production (Tonnes) Spain (Tonnes)
 
Source: Schmitz, C. J., World non-ferrous metal production and prices, 1700-1976.  
(London, 1979). 
Note: From 1820 to 1849 the prices in dollars are calculated at a fixed exchange 
rate of 0.30 dollars/mark. 
= Period of Rothschild activity in the market. 
 
This balance of power, an effective duopoly, finished in 1847 with the 
discovery of the Nueva Almadén seam, which would be followed in the ensuing 
years by others, such as New Idria (1854), Redington (1861) and Sulphur Bank 
(1873), all in California, and some other lesser ones in the state of Colorado. For 
well over a decade the USA easily outstripped Spain as leading world producer 
and, even though most of the production was for domestic consumption, the 
presence of the Californian mercury upset the market and led to drastic falls in 
prices. Later, with the opening of Monte Amiata (1897), Italy appeared on the 
international stage and became a point a reference. Along with this, there was the 
Idria production, which formed part of the Italian production from 1919 until 
1945, when it became part of former Yugoslavia. Yet Spain with Almadén would 
be the only one to maintain leading status throughout the period and it did so to 
the point that even today all dealers adhere to the Spanish measurement of 
production based on the traditional containers –flask of 34.507 kg. of mercury. By 
extension, control of the Almadén sales allowed, one way or another, control of 
the world market. 
 
As graph 1 shows, the appearance of new products did not initially cause 
prices to drop, nor did the monopoly prior to the discovery of the new North 
American deposits mean that prices were necessarily high. In fact, at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century Spain was unable recover the rate of 
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production and sales of its colonial times and so impose prices. Hence, faced with 
the bad economic situation, the government opted to publicly auction the whole 
Almadén production. 
 
The Rothschilds, who had tried unsuccessfully to gain the business in 1820, 
offering their intermediation in the trade of Almadén mercury with México
17, 
were in on the auction and with the added incentive that Solomon Rothschild had, 
before 1830, acquired control of the Idria mines in Vienna
18. So the moment to 
bank on a union of the productions from both establishments seemed to have 
arrived. This would mean that the rigidity of the mercury demand on the final 
markets would be put to the test. 
 
Yet the Rothschilds were not about to support the Fernando VII 
Government because of the decision of the monarch to relinquish the public debt 
issued in London under the previous, liberal, government. The Rothschilds were 
at that time the main intermediaries in the London and Paris stock markets and 
this put them in a clear position of conflict of interests, and so they did not 
personally take part in the bidding for the Spanish mercury. However, they lost 
little time in reaching an agreement with Iñigo Ezpeleta, the Spanish dealer who 
bought the Almadén 1830 contract for 745 reales/hundredweight
19 (approx. US 
745.55 dollars/tonne), for which they would first be given a part of the business, 
with the rest being handed over as of 1832 in exchange for a commission of 2.5% 
on sales
20. The Rothschilds took little time to buy up all the stocks on the market, 
so pushing up the prices, which started to rise significantly as of that date until 
sitting nearly 60% higher just one year on. 
 
On the death of Fernando VII, in 1833, and with the definitive 
consolidation of the liberal government s in Spain, the Rothschilds took the 
decision to handling the contract directly, so taking advantages of the financial 
difficulties the civil war (the First Carlist War 1833-1840) was causing the new 
government. In fact, all the contracts to do with Almadén which were signed by 
the Rothschilds during that century would be marked by the same incapacity of 
the Spanish Public Treasury to manage its own financing. 
 
  In order to assure themselves the contract, the Rothschilds made a first 
loan of 15 million francs to the Spanish government, which included a bank 
exclusivity clause. However, they did not succeed in including any guarantee as 
regards Almadén
21. Indeed, the situation twisted against them when there was a 
                                                 
17 Record of 12-7-1820, Archivo Histórico Nacional, Sección Estado, dossier 97. 
18 Gille, B  Histoire de Maison Rothschild. (Ginebra - París. 1965), p. 414 
19 Martín, V. 1980: Los Rothschild y las minas de Almadén. (Madrid, 1980) pp. 187-190. Castilian 
hundredweight (46 Kg, approximately) should not be confused with the British (50,8 Kg). 
“Reales” means always in this paper Spanish “reales de vellón”. 
20 Rothschild London Records (hereinafter ARL), XI/38/3-5 and Ferguson, N. The World’s Banker 
(London, 1998), 379. 
21 This point had not been accepted by Miraflores, Memorias del reinado de Isabel II, (Madrid, 
1964) 36, 39, 63-65 y 223-225. 
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sudden change in government which brought the Conde de Toreno to Chancellor 
of the Exchequer (June 1834), who would suspend the agreement
22 . The 
Rothschilds were quick to find a solution to the situation and Nathan Rothschild 
sent his son Lionel
23 to Madrid, where after six months he was not only successful 
in having the loan repaid but also gained the support of the Chancellor in winning 
the Almadén contract, which the Rothschilds took in February 1835 for 812 reales 
the hundredweight, in an auction that was full of irregularities
24, following the 
barefaced bribery of the politician and also the Queen Regent herself
25.  
 
The scandals surrounding the 1835 auction forced Weisweiller, the Madrid 
agent for the Rothschilds, to develop a complex strategy to ensure successive 
renewals, even to the extent of an explicit threat that if the contract were annulled, 
the House of Rothschild would apply for the legal confiscation of all the Almadén 
products abroad and the declaration of a stock market war in London and Paris 
against Spanish debt
26. The threat had no effect and so Weisweiller had to 
continue to fund the Government, forwarding in total some 53 million reales, all 
in limited partnership with a powerful ally, the Intendant of the Royal House, 
Antonio Gaviria, who was totally committed to the Rothschild in the negotiations 
to renew the agreement
27. The Rothschilds even went so far as to offer as to offer 
a purchase option for the mines at 380 million reales (approx. US 17.14 million 
dollars), which it turned out to be unnecessary to negotiate since there was a 
default on one of the outstanding loans with them, and Weisweiller took 
advantage of the occasion to demand the mortgage on the mine was paid off or 
that the contract was renewed. The contract, signed on 20-9-1838, did not release 
them from the obligation to grant a loan of 50 million reales and to equal the offer 
made by the Parisian banker Alejandro Aguado, of 1,200 reales the 




After the Carlist War, the renewal of the subsequent contracts was to 
become more and more complicated for the Rothschilds. In 1843, in spite of the 
Rothschilds’ efforts to avoid it, the struggle returned in the form of an auction 
which was won by the Spanish businessman José Salamanca, who paid 1,630 
reales the hundredweight. Two days later he transferred his rights to the 
                                                 
22 Martín, V. Los Rothschild y las minas de Almadén, 167-169 and Fontana, J., La Revolución 
Liberal. Política y hacienda en 1833-1845. (Madrid, 1977), 44-58 and 64-70. 
23 and Ferguson, The World’s Banker, 297-298 y 383, note 46. 
24 Otazu, A., The Rothschilds y sus socios españoles (1820-1850). (Madrid, 1987), 37. 
25 Specifically, 4,962,100 reales to Toreno and a donation to the Queen’s civil list of between 2 
and 6 million reales. Gille, B., Histoire de Maison Rothschild, 251. Fontana, J., La Revolución 
Liberal, 80, and Corti, C., The Rise of the House of Rothschild., (London, 1928) 127. 
26 Letters from Latour Manbourg to Molé of 20-10-1837, Records of the French Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, Commercial Correspondence, Madrid, Vol. 44. 
27 Otazu, The Rothschilds y sus socios españoles, 43. 
28 Martín, Los Rothschild y Almadén, 205. There is no copy of this contract in any of the records 
we have consulted. 
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Rothschilds, who thus retained the contract, albeit at a substantially higher cost – 
35.8% higher than the previous contract. 
 
What followed would not favour the Rothschilds either. Along with the 
many political problems in Mexico which were holding up the silver production, 
there was the arrival of new methods for gold-plating and silver extraction, as well 
as the discovery of the New Almadén mines in California in 1846. The London 
market began to show signs of saturation, which forced the Rothschilds to hold 
back 34,915 hundredweight of mercury so as not to affect the price dynamics
29.  
 
In such conditions the Rothschilds refused to keep on cutting their margins 
and to continue giving loans to Spain. Indeed, they were not even present at the 
auction of June 1847, which was won by the Banco de Fomento, for a period of 
five years and at 1,731 reales per hundredweight
30. 
 
The Banco de Fomento operation was a foregone failure. The House of 
Rothschild had considered selling off its mercury reserves in the face of any new 
intermediary and it lost little time in floating its prices on the cheap in London so, 
through its agents, keeping its customers on tenterhooks. And the prices 
plummeted in the British capital. In a mere six months they fell from the 2,250 
reales which held steady for all of 1847 to just 1,750 reales by June 1848, even 
though they held at between 2,400 and 2,800 reales during the same period in 
Mexico
31. During all this time the Banco de Fomento was incapable of selling a 
single vial in London, and so the government cancelled the contract and passed it 
on to the Banco de San Fernando, whose efforts proved just as fruitless as had 
their predecessors’
32. Indeed, their position was even worse, as the situation of the 
Spanish government had worsened and it had begun to accept advances from the 
Rothschilds and the house of Baring in London in exchange for mercury
33, which 




                                                 
29  Martín,  Los Rothschild y Almadén, 223 and 244 and Sánchez Molero, Memoria sobre 
mercurios, 18 
30 Martín, Los Rothschild y Almadén, 228-236 
31 Randall, Real del Monte, 187 and 191. 
32 Bank of Spain Records, Secretary’s Office, dossiers 1200 and 1201. 
33 In total, the Rothschilds and Baring lent 414,994 pounds from December 1848 to December 
1849 under various contracts, in exchange for 44,896 hundredweight of mercury. Roldán “Los 
intereses de los banqueros británicos en España: la Banca Baring y su pugna con los Rothschild 
por el control del mercurio de Almadén” Hispania, LXIII/1, 213, pp. 255-293. 
34 Mildred Goyeneche often wrote to the bank about the difficulties of placing its vials of mercury, 
congfronted by the Rothschilds, who systematically reduced their prices and offered no end of 
payment terms, Letters of 26-12-1848, 19-1-1849 and 20-2-1849, Bank of Spain Records, 
Secretary’s Office, dossier 1200. 
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Encouraged by the reports on new silver deposits discovered in Chile and 
Peru
35 that they received from their agent, Davidson, in Mexico, the Rothschilds 
finally signed an agreement with the Spanish government on January 5, 1850 in 
which they took over the 33,585 hundredweight that had not been sold in 
exchange for limiting production from the mine to 12,000 hundredweight/year
36. 
All of which left the Rothschilds with a business that they had never really lost for 
another two years. 
 
The Rothschilds sought to profit from the situation right away and reached 
an agreement with the owners of Nuevo Almadén to share out the Mexican 
market and the rest of the world. Yet the agreement was only to last a year, 
leading to a fall in prices in just a few months from 2,200 reales to barely 900 
reales
37. In spite of a loss of margins, the House of Rothschild and the Spanish 
Government decided to go on with their operations in 1852, in the form of three-
monthly renewable agreements to sell on a commission basis, at the best price, 
with a minimum of 800 reales per hundredweight, everywhere in the world except 
Spain and Mexico
38. In March 1854 the minimum would have to be reduced to 
659 reales the hundredweight. No great calculation is required to see that these 
prices are less than a quarter of those paid prior to 1847. The lack of interest in the 
business on the part of the Rothschilds is easy to understand and in 1855 they 
signed the last contract to sell on a commission basis before the Spanish 
Government recovered the Almadén sales in 1857
39. 
 
At first, the Rothschild agents in Spain did not show much faith in the 
Government’s capacity to sell its mercury, understanding that the asking price 
(10% in London above the price adjudicated in Seville) and the amount shipped 
was excessive for a sales system which no longer enjoyed a real monopoly
40. But 
the Treasury continued to make profits from its sales in London and Paris, 




The situation could only be maintained until 1866, when financial 
problems returned to the Spanish treasury, which once more was forced to resort 
to Rothschild loans. One of these, that granted on 22-09-1866, led to the 
                                                 
35 Ferguson, The World’s Banker, 497. According to Martín (Los Rothschild y Almadén, 226-227 
and 243-244) the fact that the bankers had cashed in their surpluses under the previous contract 
was also of influence. 
36 Roldán, opus cit, Ziegler, P. 1988. The 6th Power. The Barings. Collins, London, pp. 169-170 
and Martín, Los Rothschild y Almadén, 243. 
37 Sánchez Molero, Memoria sobre mercurios, 18-19 and Martín, Los Rothschild y Almadén, 226-
227. 
38 Sales commission was 1% plus costs.  Copy of the base contract for the sales by commission for 
the Rothschilds of the Almadén mercury from March 3, 1852. ARL, XI/38/245. 
39 Martín Los Rothschild y Almadén, 247-251 and 254-259.  
40 Letter of 31-5-1858, Rothschild Paris Records (hereinafter ARP), 132AQ 6152 
41 The State sold a total of 268,216 vials of mercury from 1858 to 1866, at an average of 1051,08 
reales the hundredweight.  Zarraluqui, J. Los almadenes de mercurio. (Madrid, 1932), vol. 2, 713. 
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recuperation of the Almadén mercury contracts since this and subsequent loans 




  The owners of Nueva Almadén reacted by contacting the Spanish 
government in October 1867 and requesting a long term lease of Almadén with 
the idea of pushing the Rothschilds out of the market and imposing a world 
monopoly of mercury themselves
43. But the government did not take up the offer, 
although the option of a long term lease, not a purchase of the mine, was exactly 
what the Rothschilds took up just three years later, when minister Figuerola began 
to put pressure on them to increase their loans on Almadén. Faced with the 
Rothschilds’ resistance to lend more money, in January 1870, Figuerola stepped 




  From then on the Rothschilds were obliged to analyse the advantages of 
buying the mine or to continue with their loans, at the risk of a third party getting 
in ahead of them. But given that Parliament had discarded the option of selling the 
mines they opted for a long term sales contract of 30 years with a fixed 2% rate of 
commission plus 20% of net profits, expensed deducted, in exchange for loan of 
42 million pesetas (approx. US 9.6 million dollars), at 8% for the same period
45.  
 
  In spite of heavy criticism, the contract was renewed in 1900, although 
under more favourable conditions for Spain: the term was reduced to ten years 
and the Rothschild’s commission dropped to 1.25%, while their 20% of net profits 
was due only as of 8 pounds, 2 shillings and 6 pence, a figure which would drop 
to 10% if the price went above 9 pounds, 2 shillings and 7 pence
46; additionally, 
the contract was not proffered in any financial operation and so the whole amount 
of liquid obtained, after expenses and commissions, would find its way into the 
State coffers.  
 
    Spain improved yet more on these conditions in the next contract by again 
imposing an auction, in spite of the Rothschild’s manoeuvres which included 
increasing sales so as to be more positively placed in the negotiations
47. Three 
other bids were put in at the auction, including that of the Banco de Vizcaya, 
which was clearly set on winning the contract. The Rothschilds were then forced 
                                                 
42 ARL, Various dossiers from series XI/109.  
43 Weisweiller sent the Rothschilds a copy of the proposed contract of James Eldredge, director of 
Nueva Almadén, to the Spanish Government, of 26-10-1867, ARL XI/110/6. 
44 At the time the government valued its jewel at 50 million pesetas (aprox. US 9 million dollars), 
Rio Tinto at 30 and so on to a total of 300 million pesetas of real estate properties belonging to the 
State which could be cashed in short term. Letter from Weisweiller and Bauer of 19-1-1870, ARL 
XI/101.  
45 Letters from Weisweiller and Bauer de 11 and 9-1-1870 and 18, 19, 22 and 27-3-1870 and 5-4-
1870, ARL XI/ 109/101. 
46 Martín, Los Rothschild y Almadén. 418-421. 
47 Letters from the London Rothschilds to Bauer 30-5-1910 and 19-12-1910, ARL XI/111/75. 
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to seriously reduce their demands, offering a commission of just 0.75% and 
accepting that participation above 8 pounds and two shillings would be a mere 
5%
48. Following this offer, which was considered to be the best, they were 




  It was the last of the concessions because although in 1921 the Rothschilds 
were all for renewing, the nationalist minister, Cambó, did not even bother to 
consider an auction or to renegotiate the contract, but directly transferred the 
rights of organization and sales to the Board of Directors of the Minas de 






  Nickel had been mined until the mid nineteenth century in very small 
quantities in specific areas of Norway and the United States. The metallurgy was 
complicated and only a handful of smelters were able to work the minerals from 
which the metal was extracted. The metal was still not used for its typical 
applications like alloys, batteries and minting. 
 
  However, in 1864 the French mining engineers Jules Garnier discovered 
the nickel silicate deposits in New Caledonia, which were not particularly rich but 
they were abundant and much easier to work. Nevertheless, the mining and 
metallurgy would take about ten years to become operational. Two companies 
which would double world production as of 1877 were involved. The first 
belonged to Australian John Higginson, who built a foundry on the islands (Pointe 
Chaleix) and the other was run by Garnier himself and Henry Marbeau, in the 
south of France (Bouches-du-Rhône), which imported the mineral. In May 1880, 
the three men decided to go into partnership and set up the company Le Nickel, 
with a capital of 6,250,000 French francs. 
 
From the beginning, the new company had many problems raising capital 
and already by August 1881 it was signing an agreement with the House of 
Rothschild Frères for it to take charge of the commercialization of all of the 
company’s production and to provide a credit line of one million francs
50. 
Higginson continued individually to request new loans from the Rothschilds, 
which he was not able to pay back on time. So by 1883 the Rothschilds had 
already received 36% of Le Nickel shares as surety, which was more than enough 
to control the company and to place Alphonse Rothschild’s protégé, Ernest 
Denormandie, in the chair. The board began to fill up with family and partners 
                                                 
48 Martín, The Rothschilds y Almadén, 422-423. 
49  Letter from Bauer to the British Rothschilds of 28-9-1911 ARL XI/111/75. Martín, los
Rothschild y Almadén, 422-423. 
50 ARP, 132 AQ 354. 
http://www.upo.es/econ   14
(Maurice Epfhrusi and Emmanuel Léonino), under the supervision of their 
employees, the lawyer Charles Tambour and the already mentioned Jules Aron, 
who would be in charge of technical supervision
51.  
 
The company then began to buy up the few nickel foundries in Europe, 
which were located in France (Le Havre), Scotland (Kirkintilloch) and Germany 
(Iserlohon, in Westphalia), the idea being to build up a world monopoly
52. They 
even set off a controlled reduction of the prices, which they took down to 50% in 
order to make the use of the metal popular in industry. This was more than 
compensated by the extraordinary increase in the supply, which rose sevenfold in 
one decade.  
 
In 1891, the situation improved yet more when it became known that the 
French smelter Sneider Le Creusot was going to start making reinforced steel 
sheets containing 2.5-3% nickel
53. From then on the powerful iron and steel 
industry would be the number one customer of the monopoly.  
 
It was now that the Sudbury deposits were discovered in Ontario. They 
had been located first by the Canadian Copper Company as part of a copper ore in 
1886, but when remitted for smelting to the Orford Copper Company plant in 
New Jersey, an important nickel content was detected. The joint venture of the 
two companies, which merged in 1902 together with American Nickel Works to 
set up the International Nickel Company, Ltd. (now INCO), with their 
headquarters in Camden, New Jersey, led them straight to the top position in the 
world ranking of producers. The monopoly enjoyed by Le Nickel fell apart and 
international prices plummeted.  
 
                                                 
51 Bencibengo, Yann: “Les réseaux d’influence de la banque Rothschild”. 
52 Mcaky, “The House of Rothschild”, 113. 
53 Bouvier, Les Rothschild, 257 
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Nickel prices (Dollars/tonne) New Caledonia World production
 
Source: Schmitz, C. J., World non-ferrous metal production and prices. 
 
 
The increase in industrial demand had a lot to do with the increases in 
production. Both companies increase their efforts and were joined by another two 
- Mond Nickel Company, registered in London in 1900 but operating in Sudbury, 
and Caledonia, founded in 1909 by a man from Bordeaux, Ballande, in New 
Caledonia. It did not have the strength of Le Nickel, but nevertheless had an 
important foundry in the port of Doniambo. Both were taken over by INCO and 
Le Níkel, respectively, during the slump in sales following the 1929 crisis. Mond 
decided on a friendly merger with INCO in 1929. Le Níckel did not wish to see 
itself dragged down by its new partner’s debt and decided to set up a business 
with it, each with a 50% holding and which would be a filial of both countries. Its 
name was Caledonickel, and it took over the industrial assets of both the 
companies. The new company operated successfully between 1931 and 1937, 
when the Le Níckel board opted to include it definitively among its own assets. 
 
Lead
The Rothschilds’ dealings with lead go back to the 1840s when they began 
to sign a series of contracts to export the argentiferous leads of south-east Spain, 
under the management of their agent Hilarion Roux. They would handle 11,641 
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tonnes of lead in 1860
54, which at the time represented about 22% of exports of 
this metal from Spain, which was the world leader in production at the time. 
This was to be the zenith of a cycle though. The price war set off by the 
British producers would lead to falls. The Rothschilds responded with a deep 
reform of its activities. The refinery they owned in Le Havre was completely 
modernized and agreements for long term supply were sought, so as to cope with 
a larger scale of production
55. Contracts were signed to this effect in 1877 with the 
two Spanish foundries Jorquera & Walker and Escombreras-Bleyberg, who 
committed themselves to supplying them over the next five years with a minimum 
of 500 tonnes a month of melted lead, with considerable silver content
56. In this 
manner by the early 1880s the banking family was almost the only rival of the 
Figueroa for Spanish lead exports to France. 
But the big leap forward on the lead market came in 1881 with the 
participation in the founding of the Société Minière et Metallurgique Peñarroya. 
This company had somewhat modest beginnings as it was conceived as a simple 
secondary project of the large railway companies, whose interests coincided at the 
time with the inland mines. The most important of these was the powerful MZA, 
whose major shareholder was the House of Rothschild Frères, and on the other 
hand the Cía. de Ferrocarriles de Ciudad Real a Badajoz, whose original 
promoters, the construction company Parent & Schaken and the Credit Industriel 
et Comercial, had in 1865 set up the Compagnie Houillère et Métallurgique de 
Bélmez. This company, which was soon under the control of the Mirabaud, 
Paccard, Puerari et Cie. Bank, ceded in 1881 all its lead assets, including rented 
and owned mines and the foundry it had in the town of Peñarroya, to a new entity 
with a 50% Rothschild share, a social capital of 5 million francs, which came 
from the leases of the entrepreneur Huelin, and which the Rothschilds had 
recently received following default on a mortgage loan. The Rothschilds, 
moreover, demanded exclusivity for the sales of the new business, half the seats 
on the board and an assistant directorship for Jules Aron
57. 
 
    From the founding of Peñarroya until 1889 the successive technical 
improvements allowed its first foundry to experience massive gains in 
performance, which rose from an initial refined lead production of 3,070 to 
12,180 tonnes. In 1889 the factory could not cope with all the minerals it was 
receiving, and so the first of a series of enlargements was undertaken with the aim 
of being able to process more minerals from its field of influence. The growth was 
such that the directors of Peñarroya and la Hullera, half of whom were the same, 
came to the conclusion in 1893 that it would be more operative to merge the two 
                                                 
54 Gille,  Historie de la Maison Rothschild, 548-551 and Otazu, Los Rothschild y sus socios 
españoles. 145-146. 
55 Mckay, “The House of Rothschild as a multinacional”, 109-110. 
56 The  contract  with  Jorquera was later extended to 1883 and that with Roux to 1885, ARP 
132AQ116 and Letters from Weil (Rothschild agent in Madrid) of 2-1-1879 and 14-11-1879, ARP 
132AQ6208. 
57 López-Morell, M., “Peñarroya: un modelo expansivo de corporación minero-industrial, 1881-
1936”. Revista de Historia Industrial, num. 23 (2003),  pp. 95-135.  
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companies and so strengthen the metal facet. This was carried out by a kind of 
takeover in which there was recognition for the superiority of the Peñarroya assets 
over those of la Hullera at a ratio of 2/3 to 1/3 in the new capital of 10 million 
francs. 
The new company was able to throw itself into increasing its refining 
capacity through an ambitious expansion policy based on the purchase of deposits 
and supply contracts from bordering mines, and was able to double its refining 
capacity before the century was out. The growth had an even greater value in that 
it occurred during a period of continuous falls in prices and with ever stiffer 
competition on the international market from the North American lead producers. 
However, the really huge growth of the company came about with the takeover of 
the two major lead businesses of Spain in 1912 and 1913 the Compagnie 
Française de Mines et Usines d´Escombrera-Bleyberg and the Sociedad Figueroa, 
and also the Sté. des Produits Chimiques de Marseille l’Estaque. Peñarroya thus 
took over a further six foundries as well as other chemical and processing plants 
in Spain, France and Belgium, which made it the leading world producer of 
refined lead on the eve of the First World War (118,017 tonnes in 1914), and the 
leading Spanish producer of coal, with a production of 828,825 tonnes in 1916. 
All these takeovers finished with increases in the capital of Peñarroya, which 
handed over its own shares to the annexed companies in exchange for their 
contributions. After the exchange of shares and some small extraordinary issues to 
collect funds, the social capital of the business stood at 24,375,000 francs, which 
tripled in 1917, after an increase in capital and an updating of the balance sheets.  
    































































































Lead prices (Dollars/Tonne) World production Peñarroya production
 
Source: Schmitz, C. J., World non-ferrous metal production and prices. 
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    At this point a new period began for Peñarroya, which was now a real 
transnational company. The firm would repeat the same pattern of continually 
increasing its assets in order to increase its processing capacity and assure itself 
sufficient supply. The company would put emphasis on the creation of 
subsidiaries as opposed to mergers, both in Spain, where numerous companies 
would seek their shelter in the crisis riddled 1920s, and I the rest of the 
Mediterranean arc. The list of companies set up or taken over by Peñarroya in 
those years stretched to 48, of note were the Sté. des Fonderies de Megrine (1915), 
la Sté des Anciens Établissements Sopwith  (1917), Société des Mines de 
Malfidano (1919), Societá di Pertusola, with its filial Genmamari e Ingurtosu 
(1920), la Société Rehama (Morocco) (1926), the Sociedad Minero-Metalúrgica 
Zapata-Portmán. (1930)  and, finally, the historic Compagnie Française des Mines 
de Laurium (Greece and Turkey) (1932)
58. Together they made Peñarroya the 
leading industrial company in Spain in terms of assets by the beginning of the 
thirties
59 and one of the most important multinationals of the Mediterranean.  
 
  
Copper and pyrites 
 
    Around the 1870s the possibilities of any serious participation in the 
Spanish copper market were seriously compromised due to technical problems 
and lack of investment in the sector. This was specially noticeable in Rio Tinto, 
without doubt the largest most accessible copper pyrites deposits in the world at 
the time – a real “Crown Jewel” with an estimated 200 to 400 million tonnes of 
mineral – and which neither its owners, Spain, nor any of its lessees, had been 
capable of profitably exploiting since its reopening in 1725. 
 
    Pyrite is a complex mineral, containing variable percentages of copper (1.5 
– 3.5%), about 48% of sulphur and a somewhat lesser percentage of iron. Such 
contents guaranteed its financial success. On the one hand, its relatively low 
copper content in itself ensured at least 50% profit. It should be remembered that 
at the end of C19 this metal had become a fundamental element all over the world 
since cabling and other electrical materials, like alternators had come into general 
use, not forgetting its traditional uses in military industry, bronze, coin, etc. On 
the other hand, its high percentage of sulphur meant that it was a basic element of 
sulphuric acid, today an unwanted derivate in oil refineries, but a key chemical 
reagent during the second industrial revolution, with direct applications in the 
textile, glass, soap, fertilizer industries and others.   
 
  In spite of their fleeting participation in Tharsis in 1854, the mine which 
would later give Rio Tinto no respite in the fight to be number one in the pyrites 
                                                 
58 López-Morell, M., “Peñarroya: un modelo expansivo de corporación minero-industrial”. 
59   Carreras and Tafunell, “La gran empresa en España (1917-1974)”. Revista de Historia 
Industrial, num. 3, 137 
http://www.upo.es/econ   19
market
60, the Rothschilds never showed any real interest to get involved in Rio 
Tinto despite some proposals to that effect by their Madrid Agency
61. In 1872, 
however, the Spanish government put the mine up for sale for 104,357,769 
pesetas. There were no takers for the mine, which until then had been barely 
profitable
62, so the government cut the price by 10% (to 92,756,592 pesetas) and 
called a new auction in January 1873, after first making an offer at a lower price 
to the Rothschilds, who were willing to pay 60 million pesetas for the mine
63. 
 
Just when everything seemed to be settled, an international consortium set 
up and headed by a British financier, Hugo Matheson, stated it was willing to 
come up with the 92.7 million pesetas. From this operation was born the Rio Tinto 
Company Limited
64 . There is no written record of any relation with the 
Rothschilds in the setting up of this company. 
    
    The idea of Matheson and his partners to turn Rio Tinto into a great copper 
and sulphur mining business turned out to be a great problem. To start with, in 
spite of the intense propaganda and the solvency of the entrepreneurs, the issue of 
shares was disastrous: the few shares put up for sale were exchanged for barely 
30% of their nominal value. Public distrust crossed borders, since when Matheson 
tried to put the shares on the Paris market, Crédit Lyonnais declared that the 
business was incapable of meeting its debt. The result of this unfortunate start was 




    On top of these problems there were those caused by the market. The entry 
by Rio Tinto upset the pyrites market, which until then had been shared by the 
Tharsis and Mason & Barry, located in Portugal, but near the border. The three 
firms signed an agreement in 1878 when el price of sulphur sank by 30%. Under 
this agreement the price recovered half its loss and the market was shared out 
among the three companies: Rio Tinto got all of Europe and 40% of Great Britain; 
Tharsis had 33.33% of the British market, and Mason & Barry the remaining 
26.66%. The agreement was for three years and renewable
66, yet it was scarcely 
                                                 
60  The House of Rothschild lent 500,000 francs to the Duke of Glücksberg, but the French 
experience in Tharsis failed and the business was transferred to a Scottish group directed by 
Tennant, in 1866. Checkland, The mines of Tharsis. Roman, French and British enterprise in 
Spain, (London, 1967). 
61 Letter from Weisweiller and Bauer of 12-7-1867, ARL XI/109/92. 
62  Including Bauer, who wrote to the Rothschilds: “...under such risible conditions, naturally 
nobody will pay that price”. Letter of 30-4-1872, ARL XI/109/108. 
63 Letters from Weisweiller and Bauer from 18-11-1872 to 2-12-1872, ARL,  XI/109/110 and 111. 
64 Avery, D., Not on Queen Victoria’s birthday. Story of the Rio Tinto Mines. (London, 1974). The 
consortium was made up of the British firm Clark, Punchard & Co, the  Deusthe National Bank de 
Bremen, the London insurance group Smith, Payne y Smith, the industrial bank Arthur Heywood, 
Sons & Co, of Liverpool, and Sundhein and Doesth. 
65 Avery, D., Not on Queen Victoria´s  birthday, chapter 8 and Broder, A.: Le rôle des intérêts 
étrangers dans la croissance économique de l`Espagne: 1815 -1913.. (Paris, 1979), 1471 and 
1474. 
66 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto Co., 56-57 y Checkland, S.G. The mines of Tharsis, 144.  
http://www.upo.es/econ   20
able to ward off North American competition from the Montana copper. The 
agreements finished in 1885 and the situation became so desperate that a proposal 
was sent to the Rio Tinto shareholders to merge with the other two companies and 
create a single business with a capital of 15 million pounds which would be able 
to deal with the competition once and for all and make investments profitable
67. 
 










































































































Copper prices (dollars/tonne) Copper world production RioTinto+Boleo copper production
 
Source: Schmitz, C. J., World non-ferrous metal production and prices, 
Harvey,  The Rio Tinto Company, The Mineral Industry and 
Canudas Sandoval, Las venas de plata en la historia de México 
(Tabasco, 2005), vol. 1, 593. 
 
Against this backdrop of events it is easier to understand why the 
Rothschild family decided against investing in Rio Tinto during its first 15 years, 
and opted instead for safer investments in copper mining, like the Compagnie du 
Boleo
68, which supposed a new association with the Mirabauds. Boleo was a 
medium sized Mexican mine which produced some 10,000 tonnes/year of copper 
up to the thirties. Its initial capital was 12 million francs, of which the Rothschilds 
put up 37.5%, enough to assure themselves the control of the company. 
 
At the end of the 1880s, the sudden arrival of the Rothschilds as Rio Tinto 
shareholders occurred. It all began when then famous banking family seized the 
opportunity following the upheaval, caused by the failed world copper monopoly, 
instigated by Hycenthin Secretan between late 1887 and early 1889, to buy up a 
                                                 
67 The price of the Tharsis, Mason & Barry and Rio Tinto shares had dropped to just 5.5 million 
pounds in 1887 from the 18 million pounds in 1882, Harvey The Rio Tinto Co., 71. 
68 ARP 132AQ 107 y 335. 
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large number of Rio Tinto shares and gain a dominant position in the shareholders 
assembly, a position they would hang on to for more than 80 years
69. 
 
In spite of this event, the Rothschilds showed no hurry to take control of 
Rio Tinto. They had the patience to wait as the founder directors, Matheson was 
the first, slowly left the board and to put their own pawns on the Board. From 
there, they imposed important decisions aimed at increasing profitability.  
 
The first of these decisions were financial, with three fundamental 
operations. First, there was the issue of 3,600,000 pounds in bonds, aimed at 
reducing the company’s debt, which was zero by May 1895, probably because of 
the confidence the Rothschilds’ presence inspired in the issue. All the outstanding 
bonds were paid off and annual interest payments were cut from 200,000 to just 
74,000 pounds per year. A few months later the Rothschilds included a second 
measure which divided the shares into ordinary and preferential. This rewarded 
shareholders and consolidated their own control of the company by excluding the 
more conservative shareholders. Finally there was an increase of capital in 1905, 
which served to pay off all the company’s old debts and left it free of all financial 
burdens until the thirties. 
 
The Rothschilds succeeded in imposing gradual reforms at a technical 
level through Charles Fielding, one of the directors of their London office, who 
became a director of Rio Tinto in 1900 and chairman in 1905. Fielding was a 
driving force behind the modernization of existing technologies in the mining 
production processes, for example, the modern natural cementation processes 
used for some time by Tharsis that allowed copper to be recovered from poor 
pyrites without calcination of the mineral, which led to a new product – washed 
pyrite, which had no copper but which had all its sulphur, which could be sold 
directly to the German and North American chemical industries. Rio Tinto was 
able to raise its production of this sub-product to 977,812 tonnes in 1912. Thanks 
to its good price it was a spectacular success on the market as is shown by the fact 
that in 1905 80% of American produced sulphuric acid came from the Rio Tinto 
pyrites. 
 
The outcome of all these changes was that profitability rocketed and Rio 
Tinto went through the period of huge profits that was to make it famous. From 
1897 its annual profits did not fall below one million pounds and the record year 
came in 1906, when the company made a pre-tax profit of 2,420,996 pounds. The 
effect on the dividend for the ordinary shares was spectacular. Between 1897 and 
1913 they received a mean annual dividend of 69.05% of the capital
70. As a result 
                                                 
69 The Rothschilds lent  Secretan 37,114,943 francs during the last months of the monopoly and 
received 30,783 tonnes of copper against the debt. ARP, 132AQ 117 and Revista Minera, 24-3-
1889, 96. In spite of widely held opinion, the involvement of the Rothschilds in the Secretan 
copper union affair was never proved. 
70 López-Morell, M., La Casa Rothschild en España (Madrid, 2005), chap. 8 and Harvey, C. The 
Rio Tinto Co. 
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of this success and the level of confidence that Rio Tinto inspired on the financial 
market, in 1912 the company was considered as the thirteenth industrial enterprise 






  In short, now we have seen how the Rothschilds established themselves 
over a period of time in the various markets by gaining control of a leading 
business or by means of a trade monopoly, we will move on to outline the specific 
strategies they employed in order to manage the market. There are three clearly 
distinct stages here. The first covered the period up to the First World War. The 
second, which ran through that war, allowed the family to strengthen its control of 
the market, thanks now to the importance given to their businesses by the allied 
governments involved in the war. Finally there was the interim period of the 
World Wars in which the Rothschilds abandoned the mercury market and 
gradually lost their influence in other markets, although this did not prevent them 
continuing to give priority to establishing agreement s with the competition that 




In the case of the mercury business, the Rothschilds enjoyed a pure world 
monopoly during the 12 years they controlled the Almadén output (17 years if we 
include the Hezpeleta years). They were able to apply a clear profit seeking 
strategy thanks to their privileged position with the Spanish Administration. In 
short, the price they obtained in the 1835 contract meant a huge net difference of 
112% on the maximum price reached that year in Mexico. The figure, however, 
must only be considered as a minimum insofar as the Rothschilds, with their 
monopoly were in a position to vary prices according to their customers’ ability to 
pay. The Real del Monte mining company, as did others, tried to wriggle out of 
the Rothschild monopoly as of the thirties by buying directly from London, but all 
that they achieved was to reduce their bill by the percentage charged by Mexican 
intermediaries, a saving of around 25%
72. In order to avoid losing even this 
margin and so increase their own margins, the Rothschild entrusted the mercury 
sales in Mexico to the house of Drusina, William & Co. in 1838, and the mercury 
began to be distributed through a series of sub branches in San Luis Potosí, 
Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Tampico (there along with Lameyer & Co.), while 
always seeking to maintain prices at a level which would not affect Rothschild 
sales in Europe
73 . Lionel Davidson joined them in 1843, sent as a fully 
empowered agent from the House of Rothschild in Mexico. He was to work from 
                                                 
71 Schmitz, “The world’s largest Industrial Companies of 1912”. Business History, vol.37, num. 4 
pp. 85-96. 
72 Randall, Real Del Monte: una empresa británica en México. (México,1977) 188-189 
73 ARL, XI/38/88 
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Zacatecas, Guadalajara and Guanajuato
74. In his hands, prices rose even more and 
peaked at over 3,000 reales the hundredweight, even alongside a substantial 
increase in production, something which would not save some of the emblematic 
businesses from ruin, as was the case of Real del Monte. 
 
  In the years that the 1870 contract and its renewals were in effect, the 
strategy of the Rothschilds can be basically summed up as maintaining the status 
quo with the Americans and avoiding falls in price. Up to the First World War, 
the Rothschilds had an agreement of permanent collusion with the American 
producers, who made no attempt to sell surpluses in Europe
75. The Rothschilds 
had given up their Mexican network decades before, but now European industries 
were demanding increasing amounts of mercury for new applications. Here the 
key issue was to keep the prices high by holding back stocks when the demand 
waned. Up to two whole annual productions were retained at times. When the 
price was right the Rothschilds sold to the main brokers in the City, headed by 
Alexander Pickering and J. Berk or to Leghorn Trading Mitsubishi, when not 
delivering directly to manufacturers like Chemisque Frabik or Mafra, both in 
Hamburg.  
 
  These commercial contacts which the Rothschilds had built up over their 
many years in the markets were the best guarantee to safeguard prices. Indeed, the 
Rothschilds did not shirk from threatening the Spanish government on various 
occasions that they would ruin the market with a low pricing policy were they to 
lose the contact. In 1836 they had sent a warning in writing to the minister 
Mendizábal, and they would do the same in 1897 when the House of Howley, in 
London, tried to win the contract and with a loan to finance the Cuban War. And 
they did so again when the contract was renewed for the last time in 1911
76. In 
any case, these agreements suited Spain nicely as it was able to enjoy the large 
part of the sales profits from the monopoly, although this did not stop Spain 
reducing the Rothschilds’ commissions again and again. In fact, when Spain 
directly took over control of sales in 1921, it made a carbon copy of the 
Rothschilds’ system through the Sociedad Española del Mercurio and the later 
cartel with the Italian producers
77. 
                                                 
74 Ferguson, opus cit, p. 394. In 1854 Lionel’s brother Nathaniel would join in the agency, and 
would be representative between 1854 and 1875. ARL, XI/38/78-80 
75 In fact, Nueva Almadén had already lost its dominant position, since the first seam saw its 
spectacular returns of on average 36% disappear in 1850, and the mean share values fell to 19% in 
1862, 11% in 1865 and 5.35% in 1870. The decline was only compensated in 1871, with the 
drilling of very deep wells and with important technological changes. Sánchez Molero, Memoria 
de Azogues, and Samuel Purnell, “Remarks on Quicksilver”, an article which appeared in the Iron 
Newspaper eon 4-11-1876, collected in ARL XI/ 109/123. 
76 Letter from Gustavo Bauer to the Rothschilds of 11-3-1911 ARL XI/111/75 and Letter from the 
French Embassy in Madrid to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hanotaux, of 20-11-1897, 
Records of the French Ministry of Economy and Finance, B-31.186. 
77 López-Morell, Miguel, A. “La comercialización del Mercury de Almadén durante el Siglo XIX 
y el primer tercio del S. XIX”. Boletín Geológico y Minero, nº 119 (3), 2008, pp. 309-330 and 
Segreto, L., Monte Amiata. Il mercury italiano. Strategie internazionali e vincoli extraeconomici. 
(Milán, 1991) 
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In the case of Níkel, the rupture of the world monopoly with the arrival of 
the North American producers was resolved through an  agreement with the 
Canadians in 1896 instigated by Metallgesellschaft
78. The 1896 agreement is not 
in the Rothschild records. Backed by Metallgesellschaft it spelled the end of the 
Le Níckel monopoly and initiated a clear international duopoly, in agreement with 
the Canadians. It would allow a significant recovery in prices and maintain them 
surprisingly stable until the Second World War, in spite a significant increase in 
production as of the first decade of the twentieth century, which would be 
redoubled in 1935. However, all the other agreements closed as of 1904 are in the 
records. Specifically, the one signed December 31, 1904 served to renew the 
expiring one of 16-7-1901
79 . Its promoters were Mond Níckel and 
Metallgesellschaft, but it also bound Le Nickel and the International Company, 
Canadian Copper and Orford Copper, who were already working as one company 
prior to their merger. The basic aim was to avoid the Mond production upsetting 
the market, and so it was granted 15% of the world market, estimated at 7,000 
tonnes per year (the mean of the last years). Were the market to surpass that figure, 
Mond would be able to increase its sales up to 22.5% in the next tax year. The rest 
of the market was shared out between Le Níckel and the future INCO, who each 
respected the other’s sales areas - Europe for Le Níkel and America for the 
Canadians. In any case, Metallgesellschaft would be the preferred seller, on 
commission, at the price fixed by the cartel. The agreement would remain in 
effect until the end of 1910. 
 
  In the following years the spectacular growth in demand rendered any 
explicit agreement useless and there functioned a clear separation of markets at 
stable prices, with Le Níckel and Mond selling exclusively in Europe and INCO 
in the United States. The increase in demand was such that the Canadian country 
did not even bother to refine its minerals but delivered them directly matte to the 
American iron and steel producers.  
 
    In Peñarroya the strategy to approach Metallgesellschaft in order to control 
the market was a little late and required prior negotiation. The Rothschilds had 
reserved for themselves the exclusivity for the sales of all the Peñarroya products 
in 1881 through a contract that was renewed in 1890, 1891, 1898 and 1904
80, 
through to the end of 1909. That year the German company initiated a series of 
meetings to set up a cartel of lead producers, which took place in the Peñarroya 
headquarters. The aim was not to restrict production but to establish sales areas 
and manipulate the market so that the price of lead would rise in Europe. After 
two months of talks, the proposal became an agreement which was signed by 
                                                 
78 Bouvier, les Rothschild, 257. This German consortium held a wide network of subsidiary firms 
all over the world which were devoted to extraction, profit and trading of copper. It also had as a 
member Henry Merton, the most influential of brokers on the London Metal Exchange, while in 
America it had American Metal Co. as a filial. 
79 Copy of the market agreement of 31-12-1904, ARP 132AQ91. 
80 ARP, 132 AQ 354. 
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Metallgesellschaft and Henry Merton, but also by the companies in the chart 
below, who together made up more than 40% of the world’s production. 
 
Chart 1: Participants in the negotiations to organize the lead cartel of 1909 and their 
productions for the European market. 
Producer Annual  lead  production 
G. & J. Figueroa  28.000 tonnes 
Société des Anciens Etablissements Sopwith  24 à 28.000 tonnes** 
Société LA CRUZ  2 à 3.000 tonnes 
Minière & Métallurgique de Peñarroya  53 à 58.000 tonnes 
American Smelting & Refining Cº  60 à 72.000 tonnes 
American Metal Cº Ltd*  25.000 tonnes 
Broken Hill Proprietary Cº Ltd  55 à 70.000 tonnes 
Usine de Desargentation, Sté Anonyme, Hoboken*  60.000 tonnes 
Sté Anonyme G. Dudmont & Frêres*  18.000 tonnes 
Bleihuette Call*  22.000 tonnes 
Compagnie Metallurgique de Mazarrón***  20.000 tonnes 
Source: ARP, 132 AQ 103. 
*Companies controlled by Metallgesellschaft ** Argentiferous lead not included. 
*** Pulled out of the final agreement. 
    
    However, at the moment of signing the Rothschilds declared that they 
were only willing to cede 20% of their rights to the Peñarroya lead, since they did 
not wish to fail in their commitments to a long list of long-standing customers of 
their House, which forced the company to refuse to sign the agreement. Yet 
before the year was out it was shown that the cartel was selling at an average 11 
francs higher than the Rothschilds, which led the bankers to terminate the contract 
voluntarily and new talks began with Metallgesellschaft to sell them all the lead 
production of 1910 and, possibly, that of 1911. And so Peñarroya formed part of 
the lead cartel to all effects
81. From that moment, Metallgesellschaft began to buy 
all the production and to redistribute its leads on the German, British, Italian, 
French and Russian markets and to send the silver to the Rothschilds of London 
and to various French and Russian purchasers
82 in exchange for a commission, 
which would increase in direct relation to the official market price. El agreement 
would be prolonged until the end of 1912 and it supposed an important boost for 
Peñarroya, thanks to an increase in the prices of lead, which rose from 12 pounds 
and 8 shillings in 1910 to 18 pounds and 15 shillings in 1913
83. In that year the 
contract had to be reformed to bring it into line with the new capacity acquired 
from the Figueroa and Escombreras properties
84. 
 
In Rio Tinto, a large part of their financial success was built, as could 
hardly be otherwise, on a commercial reorganization in which the hand of the 
Rothschilds was clear to see after the fracas of the Secretan monopoly. Unlike 
                                                 
81 ARP, 132 AQ 103, dossier “Peñarroya 1909” and Archive Metaleurop PYA-Juridique. Num. 
258. P.V.S.C.A., Book 5, sessions of 23-12-1909 y 26-5-1910. 
82  Report of the French Consulate in Cartagena (1913), Archives du Ministère Français de 
Economie et Finances, B-31193. 
83 Gibson-Jarvie, R., The London Metal Exchange. A commodity market. (Cambridge, 1989), 174 
84 Archive Metaleurop, PYA-Juridique. Nº 258. P.V.S.C.A., Book 6, session of 29-5-1913. 
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Almadén and nickel though, there was not a sufficient quota to dominate the 
market and so the strategy was seek oligopolistic agreements with other national 
and international producers and so, directly or indirectly, control the markets. 
 
The first moves, after taking control in 1889 were aimed at liquidating the 
huge stocks in circulation on the market since the fall of the Secretan monopoly. 
The Rothschild did not hesitate to take part in an increase in capital of the other 
great world producer of copper, Anaconda, and so gain control of and run a new 
union of producers led by Secretan and Rio Tinto. In the meantime, Exploration 
Co., the filial of the London House of Rothschild, put pressure on the other 
American producers to lower their production
85. The cartel was in operation for 
six years and served to greatly alleviate the situation of the large copper 
companies, which were able to cash in their excess stocks. 
 
Rio Tinto would lose its decisive role in the markets to the American 
producers with the creation of Amalgamated Copper Co. in 1898, which would 
bring together all the Montana copper producers. But by then the demand of the 
war industry and the definitive spread of electricity had given way to the age of 
copper and had pushed prices up. Rio Tinto took a comfortable back seat, as did 
Metallgesellschaft. Other specific agreements for the European market with other 
pyrite producers were signed in 1905 to mark out the selling areas. These would 
settle the European market and they would be renewed in 1911 and 1916, through 




The First World War 
 
  With the outbreak of the Great War, lead, zinc, mercury, sulphur and 
copper assumed huge importance as the war industries boomed. Yet not all the 
mining sector was to reap the benefits on account of the problems arising from the 
underwater blockade and the interruption of international transfers. This did not 
affect the Rothschilds’ businesses as they were able to strengthen their position as 
market managers and reaped extraordinary compensation from slump in 
productions and the general increase in prices. The exception was Peñarroya, 
which even enlarged its refining capacity thanks to new mergers and the increase 
of supplies in Spain. 
 
Graph 5: Copper, nickel, lead and mercury prices and production evolution (1913=100).
                                                 
85 Report on the copper industry in Montana (9-12-1894). ARP 132AQ 117. file 2. and Turrel, R. 
and Van Helten, “The Rothschild, the Exploration Company and Mining Finance”, 194. 
86 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto Co., 171 and Checkland, The Mines of Tharsis, 192-196. 
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New Caledonia Nickel production Peñarroya production
 
Source: Graphs 1-4.  
 
  As regards mercury, the House of Rothschild substantially reduced its loss 
of margins of the 1911 contract with Spain, keeping a stable net profit which it 
received from its participation. This was mainly achieved by the entente between 
the British Government, the Rothschilds and the Spanish and Italian Governments, 
who placed their mercury in London during the war at a ratio of one Italian vial 
per two Spanish flasks, and at a considerably inflated price, which rose from 6 
pounds in 1914 to 24 pounds in 1918. This kept the exporters happy and did not 
upset the British War Ministry too much
87. This more than compensated the loss 
of the German market, which prior to the war had become the biggest importer of 
mercury in the world (around 30,000 flasks/year). 
 
  But what the war really showed up was the need for the Spanish and 
Italian Governments to come to an agreement so as to assure the profit levels of 
the product. This was in everybody’s mind, especially since Italy had just 
incorporated Idria into its territory and the United States had lost a lot of its 




  The need for agreement became yet more apparent when the prices began 
to fall from 1920, in spite of a reduction in world production to barely 75.500 
flask, driven mainly by strong competition from Italy in London, with the country 
                                                 
87 Letter from the British to the French Rothschilds of 23-2-1920, ARL, XI-111-151. 
88 The first to be interested in the cartel were the Rothschilds, for whom the business “under the 
present terms is not so profitable, but having sold mercury to the Spanish Government for so long, 
we would like to continue to do so were this possible”. Letter from the Rothschilds to Alfredo 
Bauer, of 15-7-1921. ARL, XI-111-151. 
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putting its mercury on the market below the official prices
89. Umberto Savoia, 
director of Monte Amiata, had a meeting with Anthony Rothschild in an attempt 
to calm tempers and with an interest in knowing what strategies the Rothschilds 
intended to follow. He especially wanted to ascertain if they were going to try to 
get back Idria. Anthony denied any interest on their part but did show himself to 
be in favour of a possible agreement with the Italian mines regarding the renewal 
of its contact
90, which did not materialize.  
 
  So it can be seen how over the decades that Rothschild interests were 
related to the mercury market, thanks to their ownership rights of Spanish mines, 
which they had gained by the various mechanisms we have described earlier, they 
were able to hold on to their initial position of a practical monopoly, until the new 
American deposits were consolidated and so control access to the London market 
by competitors. During this first phase, as well as forcing prices up way above 
their costs, they discriminated prices so as to get hold of purchasers’ surpluses. 
Once the market had switched to an oligopoly, the Rothschilds maintained a 
situation of sharing out international markets with their competitors and they 
started to invest in improving mining technology and in increasing the 
performance of the Spanish mineral. Finally, during the First World War, they 
positioned themselves so as to supply the British Government by means of a 
collusive oligopoly with the Italian deposits. This led to further agreements until 
the loss of the mining rights by the Spanish Government. 
  
    Rio Tinto, for its part, was able to more than make up for the poor results 
of 1914 and 1915. Whether it was to avoid excessive dependence on the North 
American producers or because Rio Tinto was still the most prestigious mining 
company, the British Government gave the latter a leading position in the new 
share out of the market. Indeed, it was the only representative of the mining 
industry (and one of the most active it was too) on the British Metal Committee 
along with numerous metal stockbrokers and politicians
91.  
    
    Rio Tinto offset the difficulties of sending pyrites to Central Europe by 
applying for subsidies from the Ministry of Ammunition, so easing the overpriced 
shipping to the United States Their argument was that these were fundamental to 
the American war industry production and to containing prices. The company thus 
increased its exports to the extent that it had to build a new plant in Deschelter, 
Philadelphia to process 100,000 tonnes of mineral a year (which could grow to 
500,000) and to produce 3,000 tonnes of copper
92. 
  
  Likewise, when the price of copper shot up to double, far surpassing the 
130 pounds/tonne of standard copper, as an effect scarce entries, the allied 
governments negotiated to buy up all the Rio Tinto copper at a price of 115 
                                                 
89 Letter from the Rothschilds to Alfredo Bauer, of 15-7-1921. ARL, XI-111-151 
90 Report of the meeting of 19-4-1920. ARL, XI-111-151.  
91 Archives Nacionales, París, F-12-7680. 
92 Report on Rio Tinto, 1916, ARP, 132AQ 105, file 2 and Harvey (1981: 168). 
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pounds/tonne
93, so as to avoid speculation ruining the plans of the British 
Government. This provided an argument for the distributable profits to continue at 




Peñarroya would on its own also take effective control of sales and the 
initiative to drive the market. The moment was indeed ripe, not only because of its 
effect on the control of the enemy’s contraband but also because it offered a 
solution to the strong shake ups that were affecting the domestic markets. Lead 
traded on the London Stock Exchange at a fixed rate of £30 by government 
decision. But on the free Paris market it was selling at 1,900 francs (£70). 
Peñarroya was for establishing a measure to ensure a minimum of £40, which 
would be an incentive to the miners without stirring up the industry and the war 
ministries. In the face of an absence of proposals, Peñarroya offered a plan to the 
French Ministries of War and Commerce which would give some order to the 
mess in imports towards the Allies. It followed the steps used by Metallgesellshaft 
to intervene in the market, i.e. to form a large corporation of producers that would 
cover all the non ferrous metal production and would share it out amongst all at a 
fixed price. The corporation would be called Minerais &Metaux and would be 
open to any producer of any friendly nation, although Peñarroya included a list of 
companies that would support the initiative.  
 
Chart 2: List of subscribers to the French group of the Sociedad Minerais & Metaux (September 
1916): 
Ain Arko (Société des Mines de Zinc d`) 
Association Miniere Spassky Copper Mines 
Balla-Karaidin (Société Ottomane des Mines de) 
Boleo (Compagnie de) 
Bor (Compagnie Française des Mines de) 
Cahen d`Anvers & cº (Paris) 
Catemon (Societe des Mines de Cuivre de) 
Charanal (Chile) (Societe des Mines et Usines de Cuivre de) 
Compagnie Industrielle du Platine 
Comptoir Lyon Allemand 
Corocoro (United Copper Mines Ltd.) 
Cuivres & Pirites 
Demachi & Cie. (Paris) 
Djebel Ressas (Société des Mines du) 
Fedj el Adoum (Société des Mines de) 
Guergour (Société des Mines de Zinc du Huaron  
Kanguet (Tunez) (Société des Mines de) 
La Cruz (Société) 
Laurium Française (Cié. Française des Mines du) 
Malfidano (Ste. Anonyme des Mines de) 
Mokta (Société des Mines d) 
Mirabaud & Cie. (París) 
Naltagua (Société des Mines de Cuivre de) 
Ouasta Mesloula (Cie des Mines d`) 
Parzan (Compagnie des Mines de) 
Peñarroya (Ste. Minière & Métallurgique de) 
Pontgibaud (Ste. Anonyme des Mines et Fondaires de) 
Pyrites de Huelva (Ste Française des) 
de Rothschild Frères (Paris) 
Saint-gobain, Chauny & Cirey (Manufactures des Glaces & 
Produits Chimiques de) 
Societe d`Afrinage (México) 
Sopwith (Ste. des Ancients Establishments) 
Source: Archives Nationales, Paris, f-12-7679 and 7680. 
 
    The French put forward the Peñarroya project to the British, who 
gratefully accepted it, and all agreed to a new meeting to deal exclusively with 
lead, tin and zinc, which took place on the August 1
st and 2
nd 1917. Important 
decisions were taken regarding the future of the lead market
95 : As of December 
31 lead would be bought in Spain at the fixed price of 750 pesetas the tonne, and 
would then be shared out amongst the allies; all the countries committed 
                                                 
93 Report on Rio Tinto, 1916, ARP, 132AQ 105, file 2.  
94 ARP 132AQ 104, file 3. 
95 Archives Nationales, París, f-12-7679 and 7680 
http://www.upo.es/econ   30
themselves reduce their lead consumption and to restrict its use exclusively to 
those cases in which no substitute existed; there was to be a single buyer in each 
country who would fix the domestic price. Of course, Minerais & was awarded 
the exclusivity for sales in France and, as producer of the majority of the Spanish 
production, it would supply the rest of the allies.  
 
The interwar problems 
 
  As predicted, the end of the war brought with it a drop in demand from the 
weapons industry and prices would not take long to fall. It also meant a serious 
problem of excess stock which the British Government sought to soften so that the 
market would not be over affected
96. The time had come to reach agreements with 
the competition, at the risk of a generalized slump causing the indefinite halt of 
some productions.
Once the war was over, Peñarroya inherited a large part of the commercial 
structure which it had itself generated during the conflict the moment that 
Minerais et Metaux, even though it lost its position as sole buyer on the French 
market, offered to organize the sales of Peñarroya. In Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Argentina, G. y A. Figueroa would continue to organize the sales of the company 
as it had been doing for many years, and it agreed to collaborate with Minerais et 
Metaux in the sales in other countries
97. There was also, of course, the national 
actions of the Consorcio del Plomo, supported by the Primo de Rivera 
government which, despite the complaints from Peñarroya, increased domestic 
lead prices by 50%
98. 
 
    Other agreements affected the rest of the company’s production in Spain, 
such as superphosphates and zinc. Some combinations flew in the face of the 
competition, like the agreement signed by Peñarroya in 1925 along with A. G. 
Figueroa with the Asturiana de Minas, under which the first two companies would 
refrain from building zinc lamination installations in Spain in exchange for a part 
of the Belgian company’s sales profits of these products in Spain
99. All this in 
spite of the fact that Peñarroya had already amassed important blende productions 
in Spain and Italy. 
 
From 1925 the lead market suffered from an excess in production, causing 
the drop in prices which we have referred to. The delicate situation of the majority 
of the producers led to a meeting in London, in 1927, called by the Consolidated 
Mining & Smelting of Canada
100. No useful agreement seems to have come out of 
                                                 
96 The British Government held back its huge copper reserves and sold them off little by little and 
with a lot of publicity, so avoiding speculation.  
97 Archive Metaleurop, PYA Juridique num. 247. 
98 The Mineral Industry, 1934, p. 383. 
99 Agreement of 2-6-1925, Archive Metaleurop, PYA-Juridique. Nº 247. 
100 Archive Metaleurop, PYA-Juridique, 259, Book 8, session of 28-7-1927 
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it either at the time or during the following four years. Moreover, the convention 
of April 1931 held to set up the Lead Producers’ Reporting Association, which 
aimed to reduce productions and finance stocks on a common basis, was not able 
to slow down the fall in prices, and it would only last a year
101. 
 
Zinc production was similarly situated. The first cartel, which functioned 
between 1928 and 1929, was barely able to halt the fall in prices, since it could 
not stop the new producers in Australia, Canada and Mexico, who had carried out 
a massive introduction of the new electrolytic systems. A new agreement was 
reached for the following two years in Ostend in July 1931 among the major non 
American producers
102. Peñarroya, for its own part, had unsuccessfully tried to 
defend a contingent for its new electrolytic factory in Crotona and was obliged to 
reduce its annual production to a level below the total of the best three months of 
the previous years. But Peñarroya accepted a proposal from ASARCO to join the 
Metal Traders, under the form of a share or increase in the capital of that company, 
which would be formed on the one side by ASARCO and Mining Trust, the main 
shareholder of Mount Isa, and on the other by Asturiana de Minas and Peñarroya, 
in a half share with Minerais et Metaux
103. In total, a 55% reduction in world 
production was achieved along with a significant containing of prices, at least for 
the duration of the agreements. However, all these agreements were tremendously 
distorted when it was confirmed that the pound, the fundamental market reference, 
was abandoning the gold standard, and its subsequent depreciation and by the 




Far from being solved, the problems of the international market would 
heighten zing of silver sales by the American government, which was one of the 
most important customers of Peñarroya. The zinc and lead producers had further 
meetings in Brussels and London, respectively, in 1932 in an attempt to pull the 
markets out of their lethargy, but their virtual failure only encouraged the board of 
directors to approve an agreement with other French producers under which they 




  Le Níckel, whose production had until then been mixed up with that of the 
New Caledonia (Le Níckel did not use to publish its metal production figures) 
stagnated and was surpassed in the island by Caledonia. Its problems were to 
grow yet more due to a very hefty outstanding debt of Metallgesellshaft and 
Germany, and no dividends were paid out between 1920 and 1924. In 1923 there 
                                                 
101 Gibson-Jarvie, R., The London Metal Exchange. (Cambridge, 1989), 179. 
102 Gibson-Jarvie, R., The London Metal Exchange. (Cambridge, 1989), 177-179. 
103 Archive Metaleurop, PYA-Juridique. Nº 259,  Book 8, sessions of 30-7-1930 and 30-10-1930 
104 Gibson-Jarvie, R., The London Metal Exchange. (Cambridge, 1989), 177- 179. 
105 Archive Metaleurop, PYA-Juridique, 259. P.V.S.C.A., Book 8, sessions of 26-5-1932 and 29-6-
1933. The Revista Minera (1935, p. 278), confirms the adoption of protectionist measures for zinc 
and lead in France. 
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was a historic slump in prices to below 600 dollars the tonne, in spite of the fall in 
production to nineteenth century levels, which encouraged a return to the pre-war 
agreements. The purpose of a cartel made up of the three traditional stalwarts of 
the market (INCO, Mond and Le Níckel) was to assure a fixed world price for the 
sale of nickel, although INCO would keep for itself all the US sales. The 
remaining markets, in particular Europe, would be shared out at 41% for Inco, 
41% for Mond and 18% for Le Nickel. London broker Henry Garner came in on 
the agreement as a future intermediary for a large number of the contracts
106.  
 
  The aims regarding the level of prices of the cartel were met, and in three 
years the official nickel prices had become stable and pre-war production levels 
were surpassed. Le Níckel started to modernize its installations. There was a new 
electrolytic pant in Yate, in New Caledonia, and so the firm started to employ the 
same arms as its local rival, Caledonia, which despite the temporary upturn of the 
markets and the strength of its Doniambo factory, was incapable of meeting its 
financial obligations
107. This led to the pact with Le Nickel to set up Caledonikel 
on a 50% basis. INCO supported the agreement unreservedly, fearful that the 
interest of the Unión Carnegie to take over Caledonia might materialize and 
suppose a threat to its own private US market. Indeed, not only did it accept 
Caledonickel in the cartel, but also allowed it a higher market share than its 1,000 
tonne production capacity, which if it did not cover (as happened) would be met 
by INCO who would pay the French company for the sales. It even agreed to 
compensate Caledonickel for any future reduction in the sales price that might 
have to be imposed, something which came to pass in the next four years, since 
although  the official market prices were artificially stable, the cartel would 
reduce them from 1931 to 1934 at a rate of 10% per year. All of which meant that 
Caledonickel enjoyed extraordinary incomes and was able to continue paying its 
shareholders even in times of crisis
108. 
 
  The situation of Rio Tinto and of the pyrite sector in general was the most 
delicate. Before the war Spanish pyrites had dominated the market against Sicilian 
and North American native sulphur, which was hardly competitive. The 
difficulties caused by the block on European exports during the war though led to 
a scarcity of pyrites, and so the North American chemical industry began to draw 
on its own sulphur, and to such an extent that the native sulphur obtained by the 
Frash process, used to obtain sulphuric acid, rose in the U.S.A. from 3% in 1914 
to 48% in 1919. All this to the detriment of pyrites, which at the beginning of the 
war had been used in 74% of the acid produced in that country
109.  
 
                                                 
106  Agreement to create a Nickel world cartel in October 1923 and the dossier of the prior 
negotiations (September/October 1923). ARP, 132AQ 92. 
107 Caledonia had a debt of 50 million francs in bad debts in 1930, 37 of which were with the 
Sociètè Génerale. Report by Weill of 30-4-1930, ARP 132 AQ 93. 
108  In the tax year 1934-1935, for example, Caledonickel and its owner partners received 12 
million francs from INCO. Report by Weill of 23-2-1935, ARP 132 AQ 94 
109 Revista Minera. 1-1-1924. p.9. 
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  Tharsis had few exchanges with North America and barely suffered any 
losses in this market. The majority of its customers were in Great Britain, where 
the industrial network did not experience the destructive consequences of the war, 
unlike in Germany or France, where the Rio Tinto pyrite customers were in the 
main. This meant that Tharsis could face up to the new panorama with much 
better guarantees. On the other hand, the Scottish company concentrated on an 
intelligent project to improve its deposits. This included improving its industrial 
installations and purchasing neighbouring lands. The aim was to focus on making 




The area of copper was analogous to that of sulphur. During the course of 
the Great War the U.S.A. went from being traditional importers of metals to 
accounting for 66% of world exports. The situation changed even more if we take 
into account that the large North American multinationals controlled most of the 
Chilean deposits and those in the rest of South America, and also most of the 
growing Congo production
111. Not to mention that by 1921 the three large North 
American groups controlled 74% of the world’s copper refining
112. 
 
  Given all the above, the concern of the directors of the large pyrite 
companies comes as little surprise. From the early 1920s they saw the need to sit 
down and negotiate the unavoidable need to find some recipe together before the 
markets became totally free, which was not in any of their interests, when the 
market agreement expired in 1921. The Norwegian mining company Orka, which 
at the time was the number three pyrites producer in Europe, was in on the talks 
from the beginning with Rio Tinto and Tharsis. 
 
  However, after a year and a half of continuous beating about the bush, by 
the summer of 1921 the negotiations had ground to a standstill. All involved could 
see the advantages of an agreement, but no one was willing to bear the brunt of 
the cutbacks. The directors of Rio Tinto considered that Tharsis and Orkla still 
demanded too many concessions of Rio Tinto. On the other hand, Rutherford, the 
chairman of Tharsis, wanted at all costs to set a minimum market price rather than 
talk about sales areas and he rejected the proposal by Rio Tinto to extend the old 
contract y another 5 years
113. He was well aware of the serious production 
problems that had beset his rivals during six months of uninterrupted strikes in 
their mine, and these together with the well known market problems had 
prevented them paying out dividends in the two previous years. 
 
  But the Rio Tinto Co. knew it was superior and it was not about to let its 
arm be twisted. So Steel-Maitland, Rio Tinto board member-delegate and 
negotiator, presented the board with a commercial policy project based on a 
                                                 
110 Checkland, S.G., The mines of Tharsis, 195. 
111 Gibson-Jarvie, R., The London Metal Exchange. A commodity market. (Cambridge, 1989), 140. 
112 Schmitz, C., “The Rise of big business in the World Copper Industry 1870-1930”, 395. 
113 Chekland, S.G., The Mines of Tharis, 198-199. 
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systematic lowering of prices in order to regain ground in sulphur and to put 
Tharsis up against the ropes. Using the excuse of negotiating would gain time to 
build a huge acid and superphosphates plant in Great Britain and, once the 
agreement had expired, the company would be able to multiply production and 
gain 46% of the pyrites market (as opposed to the 36% in 1913), The company 
would even be able to sell in Great Britain, the traditional Tharsis sanctuary. It 
sought to cover itself and requested technical reports from the Rothschilds on 
French customers, like Saint Cobain or the Azote company
114, in preparation for 
the highly probable approaching war. 
 
  But suddenly an unforeseen possibility was on the table, a three-way 
merger of the companies
115. At first sight the hypothetic merger had quite a lot 
going for it as it would allow concentration of production, which could be 
exported to the most advantageous destinations, reaching a price, on the basis of 
the current rates (70 pounds/tonne of copper), of around 25 shillings per tonne of 
pyrite
116. Furthermore, there was the option of jointly building a huge mineral 
processing factory, which could lead to huge profits from the metals, in particular 
the iron content, something that individually was not feasible
117. According to 
Wallemberg, the financier owner of Orkla, the operation could suppose an 
increase in dividends in the region of 80%
118.  
 
The real truth though was that the Rothschilds and the Rio Tinto board had 
a lot of respect for the possibility that Tharsis and Orkla might seek an agreement 
on their own account and this would condition their goodwill towards the 
merger
119. So even though they knew very well that Rio Tinto shares were 
significantly undervalued, that Tharsis shares were too high and that some of the 
information afforded by Orkla as regards the negotiation was not entirely credible, 
Steel prepared an offer which accepted all the figures provided as valid and that 
the shares of Tharsis were worth about 1/6 of the Rio Tinto ones
120. Yet one 
month from the end of the agreement, when the merger seemed inevitable, Orkla 
and Tharsis backed out, although they did not unite against Rio Tinto. With it 
disappeared the fears of the Rothschilds of an alliance between the competition
121. 
 
                                                 
114 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto Co..171-172 and Letter from Steel Maitland to Weill of 22-10-1921. 
ARP, 132AQ 105, file 2 
115 Letter from Anthony de Rothschild to the Paris House dated 28-10-1921. ARP 132AQ 106, file 
1. 
116 Remember that in April 1921 Rio Tinto was selling at just 12 shillings the tonne Report on Rio 
Tinto of 12-11-1921. ARP, 132AQ 104, dossier 3. 
117 Report by Steel Maitland of 28-10-1921. ARP 132AQ 106, file 1 
118 Letter from Lionel to Edouard de Rothschild of 10-11-1921. ARP 132AQ 104, file 3. 
119 Letter from Anthony de Rothschild to the House of Paris of 28-10-1921. ARP 132AQ 106, file 
1. 
120 Memorandum by Steel Maitland of 11-11-1921; ARP 132AQ 104, file 3. 
121 Orkla insisted in its offer of a merger with Tharsis, but Rutherford was opposed to it, appealing 
to the need to maintain the identity of the Checkland company, S.G.-opus cit, p. 199. 
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  The old agreement expired on January 1, 1922, and hostilities began. 
Normally, Rio Tinto should have been able to defeat its separated rivals, but 
things turned out quite differently. Tharsis reacted by drastically pulling down its 
prices, so taking on Rio Tinto at its own game. It took many continental customers 
from them, like Duisburger Kupferhütte de Renania or the powerful French Saint 
Cobain
122. Surprised by how much its rival could suffer, Rio Tinto hit back on the 
English market, increasing its sales from 25,000 tonnes in 1921 to 85,000 tonnes 
by the end of 1922. Apparently, the difference in quality of the Rio Tinto 
resources went unnoticed at the time of signing, and Tharsis continued to improve 
on the successive reductions made by its rival
123. 
 
The struggle lasted a few months. All the parties suffered equally and none 
was able to come out victorious. So by the end of 1922 the producers were ready 
to renew conversations. Rio Tinto came up with the formula of an association of 
pyrite producers led by Tharsis, Orkla and itself. It would include the possibility 
of granting the association the competence to establish quotas and prices. Up to 
there, the three firms were in agreement. The discrepancies arose when it came to 
fixing the system of decisions, since Tharsis and Orkla were not willing to accept 
the supremacy of Rio Tinto
124.  
 
So, the first half of 1923 saw the prices of pyrites at rock bottom. An 
acceptable level of profits was only achieved because of the favourable situation 
of copper prices, which nobody knew how long would last. The situation took a 
turn for the worse when in June it became known that the American and Italian 
producers of native sulphur had form a production and sales cartel
125. Rio Tinto 
realized that the situation could get out of their hands and waived its veto right in 
the association
126. Following new talks and the entry of two new members, Mason 
& Barry and la Sociéte de Pyrites, the Association of Pyrite Producers was finally 
constituted in London on July 19, 1923 and for the next three years. As of that 
date the price of pyrites would be agreed on by all the members equally, and 
would function according to the following quotas: 
 









3,170,000 tonnes  3,254,550  
tonnes or more 
 %  Tonnes  %  tonnes  %  tonnes  %  Tonnes  %  Tonnes 
Rio  Tinto  50.125 1.438.590  50.481  1.499.290 50.126 1.559.990 51.126 1.620.690 50,929 1.657.500 
Tharsis 21.636  640.940  21.789 647.140  22.068 673.340  22.068 699.540 22,169 721.500 
Orkla  10.818  310470  10.818  323,570 11.034 336.670 11.034 349.770 11,084 360.750 
M & Barry 





















Source: Agreement between pyrite producers, 132AQ 106, file 1ª. 
 
                                                 
122 Checkland, S.G., The Mines of Tharsis, 199. 
123 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto C., 172. 
124Checkland., The Mines of Tharsis, 199; Avery, D. Not on Queen Victoria’s Birthday, chapter 5. 
125 Revista Minera. 8-5-1923, p. 251 and 1-6-1923, p. 298. 
126 Avery, D. Not on Queen Victoria’s Birthday, chapter 5. 
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The agreement constituted a clear case of a rationalization cartel, with high 
internal regulation, strongly centralized decisions, a firm commitment to control 
prices and reduce costs derived from a scarcely efficient separation of sales areas. 
The sulphur sub-products were given priority over the metal ones. Similarly 
noteworthy were the internal control mechanisms on sales and the decision 
making, which took mutual distrust almost to the limits. Not even the union 
between Tharsis and Rio Tinto would be enough to get decisions, which were 
subject to almost unanimous agreement of the members, something which 
represented a huge drawback to even the most minimum manoeuvrability of the 
Association at short and medium term. 
 
  The signing of this agreement had created special unease in Rio Tinto, 
although its mentors considered it a lesser evil. Former chairman Fielding, who 
had opposed the agreement thought that an absolute advantage over the rivals was 
being thrown away since Orkla and Tharsis were putting their pyrite in port at a 
cost of about 15 shillings the tonne, while Rio Tinto could produce the same 
amount for 7 shillings and six pence. Similarly, the Italians and North Americans 
were selling their unit of sulphur at 18 cents, as opposed to the 10 cents charged 
by Rio Tinto. Fielding could see no objective reason for keeping Rio Tinto in the 
Association. The company was, according to him, perfectly able lower the price 
of pyrites to 12 shillings the tonne and so put pressure on Tharsis to negotiate 
under better conditions. Many mines would close at this price including some of 
those bought by industrial companies like Saint Gobain. Such businesses would 
then be interested in buying on the market. Neither did he believe that any 
dividend would be lost, because the decrease in sale prices would be offset by the 
increase in consumption and the results from the construction of a plant in 
England where the profits from sulphur and iron would compensate what was then 




The rest of the board, on the other hand, and with the support of the 
Rothschilds, preferred to be more prudent and was not of the opinion that this was 
the best moment to terminate the contract with the association. Doing so would 
not benefit the company excessively since the market was saturated with contracts 
until 1927
128. In support of this, a study conducted in December 1924 by the 
company’s head of commerce, A.J. Clift, reported that if Rio Tinto left the 
Association it would lose up to  1,163,000 pounds in the following four years
129. 
It would also cause unnecessary harm to the members of the association, which 
could be highly prejudicial in the long term. Tharsis soon imitated the 
hypothetical industrial expansion of Rio Tinto and built more factories
130 and 
                                                 
127 Report of the interview between Fielding and Weill of 19-6-1925, ARP 132AQ 106. 
128 “Report of the meeting between Geddes and Weill”(26-7-1925); ARP, 132AQ 106, dossier 1. 
129 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto Co., 208. 
130 “Report of the meeting between Geddes and Weill”(26-7-1925); ARP, 132AQ 106, dossier 1. 
Tharsis went so far as to organize a syndicate to finance the construction of a sulphuric acid plant, 
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there was a risk of messing up the new financial support of the Scottish company 
of the size of Morgan, Greenfell & Co
131. Indeed, Fielding was left out of the final 
decision and Sir Auckland Geddes, who was in favour of negotiating, was 
promoted to chairman by the Rothschilds.  
 
  From the start the Association proved to be not very efficient. In fact, even 
though it had increased sales, this was due more to the post-inflation period in 
Germany than to the good running of the Association. Rutherford had 
manipulated it from the beginning to his own interests, taking it towards a policy 
increased sulphur prices. Meanwhile, other non Association producers like Cyprus 
Mines Corp. took advantage of the lack of flexibility of their competitors and 
gained more and more market share. At least 28 lesser mining firms had also 
voluntarily not come in on the agreement and they quickly gained 35% of the 
market. If that were not enough, the Association had been incapable of properly 
organizing the distribution of the purchasing areas, with the result that there were 
any savings in freightage and customs duties. The situation was highly 
unfavourable for Rio Tinto. It was the company that obtained copper at the lowest 
cost in all the world because it distributed a large part of its enormous production 
among manufacturers of sulphuric acid, who returned the slag, ready for metal 
extraction, at a cheap price. If, as was beginning to occur, the chemical industries 
moved towards obtaining the acid from native sulphur, the company could lose a 




Faced with all these conditions, Rio Tinto announced in 1926 that it would 
not be renewing its agreement with the association, which in practical terms was 
the same as announcing the death of the organization. In unison, and given that it 
was not disposed to let the market sink again, the board of Rio Tinto manoeuvred 
things so that the company could gain control of the market without Tharsis being 
able to get into a position where it could catch them worse off again. In October 
1926, Rio Tinto reinforced its old relation with Metallgesellshaft and together 
they formed a new organization, the European Pyrites Corporation (EPC), which 
essentially replaced the association under the conditions that were suitable to a 
Rio Tinto. During 1927 the EPC managed to persuade Mason & Barry, Orkla and 
the Spanish San Platón to waive their rights to the sale of pyrites in exchange for a 
drop in production. Other agreements followed to limit purchasing areas with the 




                                                                                                                                      
in which they put up 50% of the necessary 400,000 pounds. Rutherford shelved the project the 
moment the agreement of the Association was signed; Checkland, S.G.-opus cit, p. 199.  
131 Report of the meeting between Weill and Lionel Rothschild of 19-6-1925,  ARP 132AQ 106, 1ª 
file.  
132 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto Co., 173 y 208. 
133 Harvey, C., The Rio Tinto Co., 209;  Avery, D., Not on Queen’s Victoria, p.p. 312-313. 
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  Totally isolated, Tharsis gave in in 1929 and signed a new agreement with 
Rio Tinto. There would be no control of prices or market shares. Thereafter, the 
market would move according to a system of three lists of customers. The first list 
was that of the clients of Rio Tinto and its associates; the second those of Tharsis. 
Neither could touch the other’s list. The third list was made up of free companies 
that were not tied to either of the two businesses. Here each could compete for 
them in the conditions it wished. The agreement would be binding until 1934, 
when it was renewed, given the good results it had supposed. In April 1936 the 
chairman of Rio Tinto, Auckland Geddes, and Rutherford went to New York to 
make an agreement with American producers regarding a definitive assignation of 
the sulphur market in Europe
134. Thus the danger of a shift in pyrite was dispelled 





In this article we have analysed the employed by the Rothschilds over 
almost a century of business activity in the non ferrous minerals international 
markets. The simultaneous participation in highly diverse markets does, however, 
share a common characteristic. The use and industrial applications of these 
minerals had few substitutes, which meant that the demand was not very elastic in 
terms of market price, in turn favouring the acquisition of any surplus and so be in 
a position to exercise a monopoly. 
 
It is one thing to come in on a market with an inflexible price demand but 
quite another to attain a dominant position which allows one to put up the prices 
and to buy up any surpluses. The Rothschilds carried out a whole range of actions 
of different natures in their quest to obtain the ownership rights to exploit and 
trade favourably in strategic minerals like mercury, lead, nickel, copper and 
pyrites. On occasions they would wait patiently for the moment to buy shares in 
the companies, when these were on the stock market and the conditions for 
mining exploitation were clearly defined. On others, they would directly acquire 
the ownership of the mines via their own financial reserves, taking advantage of 
the treasury needs of governments or owner companies. On yet other occasions 
they controlled the technological processes of extraction, transformation or 
smelting and introduced innovations that, thanks to the scale economies that these 
generated, enabled them to gain important economic margins and to control world 
markets. When necessary, they would resort to all types of scheming to prevent 
competitors obtaining the finance they required, or they would flood the market 
with their surplus production so as to make the prices plummet and render 
companies they wished to buy temporally unviable. Finally, apart from these 
habitual practices, they also actively sought out incomes, blithely resorting to 
corrupt actions of all natures and insider dealings to obtain the concessions they 
desired from the Spanish Government, as they would systematically do to obtain 
                                                 
134 Checkland, S.G., The mines of Tharsis, p.p. 202-203. 
http://www.upo.es/econ   39
the mining rights of the Almadén mercury. One thing that must never be forgotten 
if we are to understand the enormous pressure they could apply is the huge 
financing power the House of Rothschild wielded and the powerful position they 
occupied through being one of the main creditors of the Spanish state. 
 
In any case, the aim of gaining a categorical share with which to manage 
the market was successful in certain situations only. The only true monopolies 
were Almadén between 1830 and 1847 and Le Nickel up to 1896. In both cases 
the existence of a sole real competitor meant a de facto duopoly until 1940.  The 
Le Nickel agreement led to stable prices for a surprisingly long time (see graph 2), 
in spite of the continued loss of importance for the Rothschild business on the 
world stage. The giants, Peñarroya and Rio Tinto, gave more weight to the fact 
that it was a dominating business in its respective markets than to a share of a 
market where there was little concentration in demand. 
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Graph 7: Operative profits of Rio Tinto, Peñarroya and Le Nickel and 
Almadén during the years of Rothschild control, 1830-1935.  
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In terms of their companies and the markets they were involved in, the 
consequences of their actions were far reaching. On the one hand it is seen how 
the market agreements they favoured significantly slowed down any processes of 
concentration of those involved, as well as many processes of vertical integration 
of their production, which would have been highly recommendable in a 
competitive scenario. For the same reason, the technological factor was relegated 
to a second level and businesses involved agreed to forgo improving both the 
scale of their production and reducing  prices by any of the various means they 
had available. However, it seems more than clear that the strategy was more 
profitable for the businesses and promoters alike. The long term effect on results 
was spectacular (See graph 5). Evidently the profits were greater in the periods of 
greater market control and, specifically, according to markets in chronological 
terms, it was as follows: Mercury (1835-1847, world monopoly), Copper (1895-
1918, friendly world oligopoly for copper and sulphur), Lead (1909-1930, cartel 
and control of sales) and Nickel (1896-1940, world duopoly).  
 
In short, the decisive factor of the commercial strategy of these businesses 
was the Rothschilds’ determination to use agreements, or when possible absolute 
sales monopoly, based on their own, or an associated, commercial network that 
was at the level that the secondary sector was acquiring.  
 
It was the result of premeditated decisions. The Rothschilds’ natural 
modus operandi was the monopoly and they systematically refused to participate 
in economic activities in which they would have to compete on an equal footing 
with others. In short, they staked their interests in business sectors or areas where 
control of the market would result directly in extraordinary profits. The inherent 
profits of such actions were not always tangible, on occasions they opened the 
door to parallel speculations on the London Metal Exchange or the Paris and 
London stock markets, which did not cash available funds, but at the most basic 
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quantifiable level gave them the portfolios of the businesses in question and from 
there, abundant profits (See graph 6).  
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In our opinion the case of the Rothschilds is a spectacular illustration of 
the business tendency to seek out positions of market power and it represents a 
relevant experience of how the lack of international market regulations when there 
are inflexible demands makes it difficult for the efficient equilibriums of 
competitive markets to come about. Today there is much talk about global 
economy, its market failings and the need for international regulation. The case 
studied here shows that the problem is not so new and it reveals the scope of large 
financial businesses and their skill in spheres which can provide them with high 
returns by entering and exiting markets depending on the situation and the 
economic conditions. 
Appendix 1 





Public Debt (29 different titles         80.507.106   
Shares in credit banks (10 entities)    12.220.823   
Banque de France       1.300              5.135.000   
Others 9           7.085.823   
Shares in Insurance (7 companies)    5.778.875 
Shares in diamond mines          62.190.792   
De Beers (preferential)       35.883           16.290.882   
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De Beers (ordinary)       74.634           45.899.910   
Shares in coppper mines (3 companies)       126.026.134   
Cie du Boleo       3.772            20.368.800   
Rio Tinto (preferential)          354                  53.454   
Rio Tinto (ordinary)      47.356         105.603.880   
Sharesin other mining and industrial companies (22 companies)    39.322.419   
Le Níkel       8.116              6.249.320   
Sté Minière et Metallurgique Peñarroya      14.036           16.843.200   
Sté d'Eclairage et force pour l'électricité       8.940              6.213.300   
A further 19 companies         10.016.599   
Shares in oil and oil related companies    22.935.495 
Sté de Naphte Caspiéne (Bnito)       5.683              7.515.767   
Royal Dutsch Petroleum Co.          321              4.753.882   
Shell Transport & Trading Co.      25.000               947.063   
Sté de Naphte Mazout       9.940              3.286.412   
A further 11 companies           6.432.371   
Shares Canals, ports and waters         19.668.239   
Suez Canal       2.536            11.450.040   
Cié Genérale des Eaux       3.272              6.511.280   
A further  5 companies           1.706.919   
Shares in gold mines and prospecting (43 companies)           8.108.756   
Shares in French railways    39.627.248   
Nord      19.595           34.781.125   
París Lyon-Mediterranée       2.519              3.287.295   
A further 3 companies           1.558.828   
Shares in American railroads (7 companies)           4.994.830   
Shares in foreign railways (4 companies)    17.224.363   
Lombardos       35.619             6.589.515   
Madrid-Zaragoza-Alicante      24.321           10.336.425   
A further 2 companies             298.423   
Jouissance  shares (11 securities)             925.258   
Bills and participations (14)         14.958.170   
City and State bonds (3)           1.299.930   
Various company bonds (8)           1.813.466   
French and foreign railway bonds (14)   13.757.294   
Chemins du sud de l'Austriche      17.622             8.722.890   
A further 13            5.034.404   
American railroad bonds (5)           4.428.154   
Values under negotiation or in syndicate (15)           2.750.516   
TOTAL PORTFOLIO VALUE       478.537.868   
Source: Rothschild Records, London, RFamFD/5. 
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Evolutionary stages of the mercury market 
Date Name Sponsor  Participants  Form  Conditions  Effectiveness   
1830-1847  Rothschild 
monopoly   - Rothschild  - Almadén 
  World monopoly  
Monopoly sales in 
London and Mexico 
by Rothschild agents 
- Rise in prices 
( 179%) 
- Stability of 
supply. 
1847-1866 Competition  -  - Almadén  
- New Almaden  Competition -  - Sinking of prices 
( 50%) 





- Almadén  
- Quicksilver 
Mining Co. 
World duopoly  - Respect for sales 
areas. 
- Stable prices 
(except 1870-1875) 
- Increase in world 
supply ( 60%) 
1914-1918  War  - Rothschild  - Almadén.  European duopoly  - Saless: one Italian  Rise in prices 
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Agreement - Monte  Amiata 
- British, Spanish 
and Italian 
Governments 
- Monte Amiata  vial per two 
Spanish flask,  




Evolutionary stages of the lead market 




cartel of lead 
producers 
Metallgesellschaft  - See chart 1  World cartel  - Single seller on 
commission. 
- Quotas. 
- Rise in prices 
( 66%) 
- Increase in 
world supply 
( 10%) 
1917-1918 Minerais  & 
Metaux 
Peñarroya  32 companies  European Cartel  - Central sales 
- Single price 








(50% of world  
production) 
World cartel   Restrictions on and 












Argentina and Peru 




Evolutionary stages of the nickel market 
Date Name Sponsor  Participants  Form  Conditions  Effectiveness   
1881-1891  Nickel 
monopoly   - Le Níckel.  - Le Níckel.  World monopoly   Single seller 
-  Controlled drop 
in prices. (up 
to 50%) 
- Increase in 
supply (*7) 
1891-1996 Competition  - 





- Sinking of prices 
( 60%) 
- Reduction in 
production ( 20%) 
1895-1901 Nickel  cartel  Metallgesellschaft 





World cartel  Not known 
- Recovery of 
prices. 
- Increase in world 
supply ( 100%) 
1901-1910 Nickel  cartel 
- Metallgesellsch
aft 
- Mond Nickel 
- International 
Níckel Company  
- Mond Nickel  
- Le Níckel 
World cartel 
-Single seller on 
commission. 
- Territorial division. 
-Mond Nickel quota 
of 15% of market 
-Stable  prices 
-Increase in world 
supply ( 100%) 




- Mond Nickel  
- Le Níckel 
- Henry Gadner 
- International 
Níckel Company  
- Mond Nickel  
- Le Níckel 
- Henry Gadner 
World cartel 
(except EEUU) 
- Quotas : 
Inco: 41%. 
Mond : 41% 
Le Nickel: 18% 









- Mond Nickel  
- Caledonickel 
- International 
Níckel Company  





- INCO compensates 








Evolutionary stages of the pyrites market 





- Rio Tinto  
- Tharsis  
- Mason & Barry 
- Rio Tinto  
- Tharsis  
- Mason & Barry 
European cartel  - Increase in prices 
- Shared out market 
- Increase in 
prices (˦19%) 
- Increase in world 
supplyl 
1905-1921 Cartel  de 
productores 
ibéricos de 
- Rio Tinto 
Tharsis y 
Mason &Barry. 
- Rio Tinto  
- Tharsis  
- Mason & Barry 
European cartel  - Shared out market  Independent for 
each producer 







- Rio Tinto 
- Rio Tinto  
- Tharsis  
- Mason & Barry 
- Orkla 
- S. Francaise des 
Pyrites 







- Rio Tinto 
 
- Rio Tinto  
- Mason & Barry 
- Orkla 
- S. Francaise des 
Pyrites 
- Cyprus Co. 
- Menggen 
- Oberungarishe 













- Rio Tinto  
- Tharsis 
- Rio Tinto  
 







Evolutionary stages of the copper market 









World monopoly   Three-year 
exclusivity contracts  





Rothschild   Rio Tinto and 
Anaconda 
World cartel  •Agreement with the 
other producers 
•Mantaining Stocks  
• Progressive sales 










World cartel  •Common agency for 
non USA sales 
•Quotas 
•Single fixed sales 
price 


























Cie. De Mines de Bor 
Rio Tinto 
World cartel  Control of prices and 
productions 
according to the 
market outside the 
U.S.A. 
Recovery of 
prices (1930 
levels) 
Increase in 
production 
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